Email Delivery Proof via Server-Side Cryptographic Hashing
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current email systems lack reliable proof of delivery and content, especially in cases where recipient cooperation is not assured, and existing methods are cumbersome, require special software, and are not economically viable for service providers.
Innovation Solution
A system that generates and verifies digital signatures for email messages, providing secure and tamper-proof documentation of delivery and content, using a server that acts as an intermediary to record and authenticate message transmission and receipt, without requiring special software from senders or recipients.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a sender requests delivery notification through existing e-mail systems, then the sender receives notification that the message was delivered, but the receipt may be altered or created by anyone at any time and lacks reliable proof of delivery
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a trusted third-party service that acts as an intermediary to generate and manage cryptographic proof of delivery. This service receives the original message, generates a cryptographic hash, and provides the sender with a verification code that cannot be forged. The intermediary's involvement ensures reliability without requiring complex changes to the existing e-mail infrastructure, as the proof mechanism operates independently of the message transmission path.
Solution Approach 2:
The system creates a cryptographic copy (hash) of the original message that serves as immutable proof of its content and delivery status. This cryptographic copy is generated by the trusted third party and provided to the sender, allowing verification without requiring the sender to store or protect the original message. The copy is mathematically linked to the original but cannot be altered without detection.
2Reliability
If third party services are used to provide proof of delivery, then reliable proof can be obtained, but the system requires enrollment and web site interactions that are cumbersome and slow
Solution Approach 1:
The trusted third-party service performs preliminary actions by pre-generating cryptographic verification codes and storing them in association with the original message before delivery occurs. When the recipient delivers the message, the proof is already prepared and can be immediately verified without requiring the sender to interact with a web site or perform complex enrollment procedures at the time of verification.
Solution Approach 2:
The system enables self-service verification by providing the sender with a verification code and public key that allow them to independently verify delivery proof without requiring interaction with the third-party service provider. The sender can verify the proof locally using the provided tools, eliminating the need for cumbersome web site interactions and making the process as convenient as conventional e-mail.
3Reliability
If third party services retain copies of messages to provide proof, then delivery proof can be verified, but substantial computational resources are required for data storage and tracking
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of retaining and storing copies of the entire original messages, the trusted third-party service creates and stores only cryptographic hashes (compact digital fingerprints) of the messages. These hashes are exponentially smaller than the original messages and can be stored efficiently. The service verifies delivery by comparing the hash of the delivered message against the stored hash, requiring minimal computational resources for both storage and verification operations.
Data Source
AI summary
A server transmits a message from a sender to a recipient. The server receives from the recipient an attachment relating to the message route between the server and the recipient. The server transmits to the sender the message and the attachment and their encrypted digital fingerprints and expunges the transmitted information. To subsequently authenticate the message and the attachment, the sender transmits to the server what the server has previously transmitted to the sender. The server then prepares a digital fingerprint of the message and decrypts the encrypted digital fingerprint of the message and compares these digital fingerprints to authenticate the message. The server performs the same routine with the attachment and the encrypted digital fingerprint of the attachment to authenticate the attachment the recipient replies to the sender's message through the server. The server records proof of the delivery and content of the reply to the sender and the recipient.