Embedded Sensor Network for Tamper-Proof Shipping Container Security

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current systems for securing shipping containers against tampering and detection of sensitive assets are vulnerable to shielding, communication interference, and adversary manipulation, particularly when devices are in the hands of potential enemies during loading.

Innovation Solution

The integration of dispersed, interconnected electronic components within structural members of secured assets, such as shipping containers, using a dielectric composite material, with remote management capabilities and high-energy destruction mechanisms to ensure tamper detection and prevention.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Difficulty of detecting and measuring

If detecting devices are embedded in containers to monitor for suspicious materials, then detection capability is improved, but the system becomes vulnerable to shielding, communication interference, and adversary manipulation

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection capabilityVSAvoidsystem vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Difficulty of detecting and measuringVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The detection system is divided into multiple independent detecting devices distributed throughout the container. Each device operates autonomously and reports to a centralized system, making the overall system more resilient to localized failures, shielding, or manipulation of individual devices.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A communication interface acts as an intermediary between the detecting devices and the external monitoring system. This interface includes authentication and encryption mechanisms that verify the legitimacy of data sources and prevent communication interference or manipulation by adversaries.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Extent of automation

If communication interface is used to report suspicious activities, then external monitoring is enabled, but the interface can be defeated by rogue employees or altered container contents

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveexternal monitoringVSAvoiddata integrity
Core Design Contradiction:
Extent of automationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system incorporates feedback mechanisms where the communication interface receives authentication signals from the centralized monitoring system and verifies data integrity before reporting. This feedback loop detects and prevents rogue employee manipulation or false reporting.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

Authentication credentials and encryption keys are pre-loaded into the communication interface and detecting devices before container sealing. This preliminary setup ensures that only authorized devices can communicate with the external system, preventing data tampering or fake reports.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Adaptability or versatility

If detectors are disconnected from the interface or external systems are overcome, then adversary strategies to defeat detection are enabled, but the detection system fails to report evidence

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveadversary countermeasuresVSAvoiddetection evidence
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The system includes redundant detection devices and backup communication channels that can activate if primary systems are disconnected or overwhelmed. This beforehand cushioning ensures continuous detection capability and prevents loss of evidence even when adversaries attempt to disable the primary detection interface.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #11Beforehand cushioning (Prior cushioning)

Solution Approach 2:

The system maintains local copies of detection data in memory within the detecting devices and communication interface, independent of external systems. This copying ensures that detection evidence is preserved even when external communication is blocked or the interface is overcome by adversaries.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

4Reliability

If multiple dispersed electronic components are integrated into structural members, then tamper detection and remote management are improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetamper detectionVSAvoidelectronic components
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

Multiple electronic components including detecting devices, communication interface, and power sources are merged into integrated structural members. This combining reduces the number of separate parts, simplifies installation, and makes tampering more difficult while maintaining all necessary functions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

Solution Approach 2:

The structural members are constructed from composite materials that integrate electronic components within the material structure itself. This approach embeds the electronics in a way that is difficult to separate or tamper with, reducing overall system complexity while improving security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #40Composite materials

Data Source

PatentUS7576653B2Secure panel with remotely controlled embedded devices
Publication Date: 2009.08.18 ANGEL SECURE NETWORKS INC
  • US7576653B2 patent drawing
  • US7576653B2 patent drawing
  • US7576653B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Devices and methods for securing an asset include providing a plurality of dispersed, interconnected electronic components integrally attached to a structural member of the secured asset. Each electronic component of the plurality of components is in communication with a remotely accessible interface and includes a memory for storing a respective sub-division of at least one numeric value. The numeric values can be inserted, altered, or deleted remotely through the remotely accessible interface. Upon detection of an attempted breach of the secured asset or tamper with the structural member, one or more of the stored sub-divisions are selectively destroyed. Detection of an attempted breach or tamper is remotely observable upon inspection of a previously stored numeric value, subsequently altered in response to detection of a breach of the secured asset.