EMI Sensor Circuit for Semiconductor Tamper Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing semiconductor devices lack effective mechanisms to prevent and detect electromagnetic interference (EMI) attacks and physical tampering, compromising security in electronic systems.
Innovation Solution
Incorporation of EMI sensors, including E and H field sensors, with a sensing circuit to monitor voltage fluctuations and generate a failsafe response upon detection of EMI attacks or physical tampering, utilizing hysteresis comparators and voltage level comparators to differentiate between legitimate signals and malicious interference.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If EMI sensors and sensing circuits are added to detect EMI attacks and physical tampering, then security and detection capability are improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The sensing circuit is divided into separate functional blocks: E field sensor, H field sensor, hysteresis comparator, and voltage level comparator. Each sensor type independently detects specific aspects of EMI or tampering, allowing the system to monitor multiple threat vectors simultaneously while maintaining modular architecture that manages complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The sensing circuit serves multiple security functions: detecting EMI attacks through E and H field sensors, detecting physical tampering through voltage level comparators, and providing failsafe responses. This multi-functionality consolidates what would otherwise require separate systems into a single integrated security module.
2Measurement precision
If hysteresis comparators and voltage level comparators are used to differentiate between legitimate signals and malicious interference, then measurement precision is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The hysteresis comparator implements feedback through its inherent hysteresis characteristic, where the comparator threshold depends on the previous output state. This feedback mechanism creates distinct upper and lower thresholds that prevent false triggering on noise edges, enabling precise differentiation between legitimate signal transitions and malicious EMI interference.
Solution Approach 2:
The sensing circuit utilizes parameter changes in voltage levels to detect different types of threats. The voltage level comparator monitors for specific voltage thresholds indicating physical tampering, while the hysteresis comparator detects EMI-induced voltage fluctuations. By monitoring multiple voltage parameters simultaneously, the system achieves high detection precision.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
Effectively detects and responds to EMI attacks and physical tampering, ensuring the security of secure data by placing the system into a safe state to prevent hacking.
Implementation Method 1
an electric (E) field sensor and a magnetic (H) field sensor to avoid EMI attacks
Implementation Method 2
an electric (E) field sensor and a magnetic (H) field sensor to avoid EMI attacks
Implementation Method 3
The sensing circuit includes a hysteresis comparator having a first input coupled to a first node of the EMI sensor via a low pass filter
Data Source
Figure 1
Figure 2
AI summary
A semiconductor device includes a secured circuit, an electromagnetic interference (EMI) sensor over a surface of the secured circuit, and a sensing circuit. The EMI sensor is configured to receive a reference voltage and the EMI sensor includes at least one of electric (E) field sensor or a magnetic (H) field sensor. The sensing circuit includes a hysteresis comparator and a voltage level comparator. The hysteresis comparator has a first input coupled to a first node of the EMI sensor via a low pass filter, a second input directly connected to the first node, and an output configured to provide an output indicative an EMI attack. An antenna portion of the EMI sensor includes the first node and is coupled between inputs of the voltage level comparator, in which the voltage comparator is configured to provide an output indicative of a physical tampering with the antenna portion.