Encrypted Boot Volume Access via Out-of-Band Token Authentication
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Solution Overview
Problem
In multi-tenant cloud-based infrastructure services, managing encrypted boot volumes poses challenges due to the need for secure key management, as existing methods like obfuscation are not considered adequate, and there is a demand for more secure means to handle security tokens for encrypted boot volumes.
Innovation Solution
The system creates a security token that is shared between the new server instance and a key server using an out-of-band communication channel during the initial unencrypted pre-boot sequence, allowing the instance to authenticate and obtain a cryptographic access key for the encrypted boot volume, ensuring only authorized instances access the encrypted data.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If obfuscation is used to protect cryptographic keys embedded in memory images, then key extraction becomes difficult, but obfuscation is not viewed as an adequate measure of protection
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the cryptographic key from the memory image and stores it separately in a secure key server. The key is obtained during the boot process through authentication, rather than being embedded in the image. This separation eliminates the need for obfuscation while providing stronger security through physical and logical isolation of the key from the instance.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a key server as an intermediary between the memory image and the instance. The key server authenticates the instance and provides the cryptographic key only after verification. This intermediary layer enables secure key distribution without embedding keys in images, resolving the contradiction between ease of deployment and security.
2Ease of operation
If cryptographic keys are embedded in memory images, then key distribution is simplified, but security is compromised as images can be extracted and analyzed
Solution Approach 1:
The cryptographic key is extracted from the memory image and stored separately in a secure key server. During boot, the instance authenticates with the key server and receives the key dynamically. This approach maintains ease of key distribution through automated authentication while eliminating the security vulnerability of embedded keys that can be extracted from images.
Solution Approach 2:
The key server performs preliminary authentication of the instance before providing the cryptographic key. This preliminary verification ensures that only authorized instances receive keys, maintaining security while simplifying distribution through automated pre-validation rather than manual key management.
3Reliability
If encrypted boot volumes are implemented, then data privacy is enhanced, but key management complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The key server acts as an intermediary that manages cryptographic keys for encrypted boot volumes. It handles key storage, authentication, and distribution automatically, reducing key management complexity while maintaining strong data privacy through centralized secure key control.
Solution Approach 2:
The instance performs self-authentication with the key server during boot, automatically obtaining the cryptographic key needed to decrypt its boot volume. This self-service mechanism eliminates manual key management overhead while ensuring data privacy through automated secure key distribution.
Data Source
AI summary
In an resource-on-demand environment, dynamically created server instances are allowed to boot from encrypted boot volumes. Access keys to the boot volumes are provided from a key provider that authenticates new instances based on possession of a security token that has been previously shared between the key provider and the new instance through an out-of-band communication.