Encrypted Message Verification Using Intermediary Proof
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Solution Overview
Problem
In electronic voting systems, voters rely solely on their own efforts for verifying the integrity of their cast votes, which is inefficient and vulnerable to corruption, as they may not detect tampering by the encoding device used to generate the encrypted votes, especially when encryption schemes obscure the original voting options.
Innovation Solution
A method that allows any third party, including the voter, to verify the correctness of the encoded message without decrypting it, by using an encoding module to generate an encoding and verification information, which is then validated by a reception module using public information, ensuring the encoding corresponds to the voter's intended message.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If encryption schemes with randomization are used for encoding voting options, then voter privacy is protected, but the ability to detect tampering by the encoding device is lost
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces verification information as an intermediary element that mediates between the encrypted vote and the voter. This verification information contains proof that the encoding device correctly encoded the voter's selection without revealing the selection itself, thus maintaining privacy while enabling verification of correct encoding
Solution Approach 2:
The patent segments the voting system into distinct functional components: the encoding device that creates the encrypted vote, the verification information generator that creates proof of correct encoding, and the voter who verifies the proof. This segmentation allows each component to perform its specific function independently, enabling verification without compromising privacy
2Reliability
If cast-as-intended verification is performed only by the voter using individual verification mechanisms, then voter privacy is maintained, but the effort and responsibility of verification relies solely on the voter which presents several drawbacks
Solution Approach 1:
The verification information is designed to be universally verifiable by any party with access to the public key and verification algorithm, not just the voter. This multi-functionality allows voters, observers, and auditing entities to independently verify encoding correctness without requiring specialized audit devices or complex computational resources
Solution Approach 2:
The system enables self-verification where the verification information contains all necessary elements for any party to independently verify correct encoding without requiring assistance from the encoding device or other external entities. The verification process is self-contained and does not require trust in the encoding device
3Reliability
If an audit device with strong security features and computational power is required for verification, then verification robustness is improved, but device complexity and accessibility are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The verification information is designed to be lightweight and computationally inexpensive to verify, comparable to verifying a digital signature. Any standard computing device can perform the verification without requiring specialized hardware or significant computational resources, making verification accessible to all voters and observers
Data Source
AI summary
The method comprising: a) receiving, by an encoding module computer device (103), from a user (100), a message (101) including a content to be encoded; b) generating, by the encoding module (103), a generated encoding (104) of the content of the provided message (101) using encoding information (112); c) sending, by the encoding module computer device (103), the generated encoding (104) to a reception module computer device (106) and verifying, by the reception module computer device (106), that the generated encoding (104) corresponds to the encoding of the content of the message (101) by using a generated verification information (105) and public information (107), wherein the at least one code (102) having a cryptographic relationship with the public information (107) and the message (101), and the public information (107) and the message (101) having a cryptographic or a public relationship.


