Encryption Device Side Channel Attack Countermeasure
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Solution Overview
Problem
The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) system requires a countermeasure against side channel attacks, which are passive attacks that derive a private key by measuring power or electromagnetic waves during encryption/decryption operations, and existing solutions have high power consumption and unsatisfactory energy efficiency.
Innovation Solution
The encryption and decryption devices alter the processing sequence of arithmetic operations to prevent side channel attacks without generating random numbers, using a key scheduling unit to generate round keys and a data mixing unit that includes nonlinear and linear conversions to secure data against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a random number masking countermeasure is implemented to prevent side channel attacks, then security against side channel attacks is improved, but power consumption increases and processing performance deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the random number generation component from the side channel countermeasure system. Instead of using random number masking (which consumes significant power and resources), the invention uses a fixed, pre-computed masking value that is derived from the key scheduling unit's operations. This removes the heavy random number generation processing while maintaining the security function.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces the expensive and resource-intensive random number generation with a disposable, pre-computed masking value. This masking value is generated once from the key scheduling unit's intermediate data and then reused for the entire encryption process, eliminating the need for continuous random number generation and significantly reducing power consumption.
2Reliability
If a random number masking countermeasure is implemented to prevent side channel attacks, then security against side channel attacks is improved, but processing speed and circuit size are adversely affected
Solution Approach 1:
The patent removes the random number generation circuitry from the system. By using a fixed masking value derived from the key scheduling unit's operations, the invention eliminates the need for separate random number generation circuits, thereby reducing overall circuit size and complexity while maintaining side channel attack resistance.
Solution Approach 2:
The masking value generation process is integrated into the existing key scheduling unit's operations. The same intermediate data from the key scheduling unit is used both for key generation and for creating the masking value, making the system more efficient and reducing the need for additional dedicated components.
3Reliability
If a random number masking countermeasure is implemented to prevent side channel attacks, then security against side channel attacks is improved, but processing performance is adversely affected
Solution Approach 1:
The masking value is pre-computed from the key scheduling unit's intermediate data before the main encryption process begins. This preliminary action allows the masking to be applied without requiring continuous random number generation during the encryption operations, thereby maintaining high processing speed while ensuring security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses a disposable, pre-computed masking value that does not require continuous generation. This approach eliminates the performance penalty associated with continuous random number generation, allowing the encryption process to run at full speed while maintaining side channel attack resistance through the use of the pre-computed mask.
Data Source
AI summary
According to one embodiment, an encryption device includes a storage unit, an input unit, first to fourth partial encryption units, a generation unit, and an output unit. The first partial encryption unit calculates first intermediate data from input plain data to store in the storage unit. The generation unit generates a round key, which is used in calculations for the first intermediate data and N-th intermediate data, from the secret key. The second partial encryption unit calculates (i+1)th intermediate data from i-th intermediate data (i is smaller than N) and the round key to store in the storage unit. The third partial encryption unit performs an arithmetic operation including predetermined conversion for mixing the N-th intermediate data, and calculates (N+1)th intermediate data to store in the storage unit. The fourth partial encryption unit obtains encrypted data by performing an arithmetic operation including inverse conversion of the conversion on the (N+1)th intermediate data.