Conditional Access Encryption Marker Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

In conditional access systems, particularly in Pay-TV, it is challenging to synchronize encryption keys with data packets, leading to incorrect decryption and access issues due to the inability to include key change information within fixed-length data packets, resulting in frequent errors where a packet is decrypted with the wrong key.

Innovation Solution

The method involves encrypting data packets with alternating keys and padding values, creating marking blocks, and decrypting mixed blocks to verify correct key usage, ensuring that only the correct key decrypts a packet to include a marker, thereby preventing key confusion and ensuring access.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If data packets are encrypted with changing keys to improve security, then security level is improved, but the ability to synchronize decryption keys with data packets deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity levelVSAvoidkey synchronization complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by pre-calculating and inserting encrypted marker values into data packets during the encryption process. These markers are prepared in advance and embedded within the packet structure, allowing the receiver to verify key correctness without requiring complex synchronization mechanisms. The markers are computed before transmission using the same key that encrypts the packet content.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces encrypted marker values as intermediaries between the encryption key and the decryption verification process. These markers serve as mediators that carry key-verification information within the packet itself, enabling the receiver to test multiple keys without external synchronization. The markers act as a bridge that links the cryptographic key to the packet content in a self-contained manner.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Ease of manufacture

If fixed-length data packets are used to maintain packet structure, then packet formatting is simplified, but the ability to include key change information within packets deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepacket formatting simplicityVSAvoidkey change information
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of manufactureVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies the nested doll principle by embedding encrypted marker values within the existing fixed-length packet structure. The markers are nested inside the packet as part of the encrypted content, utilizing the same space already allocated for data. This allows key verification information to be contained within the fixed-length packet without requiring additional space or changing the packet format.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #7Nested doll (Nesting)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent uses parameter changes by transforming the marker into an encrypted form that fits within the fixed packet structure. The marker is encrypted using the same key as the packet content, changing its parameter state from plain text to encrypted form. This allows the marker to be included within the fixed-length constraint while still carrying key verification information.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Reliability

If decryption attempts are made with multiple keys to ensure correct key usage, then key verification capability is improved, but the frequency of random marker matches and access errors deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey verification capabilityVSAvoidrandom marker matches
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies asymmetry by using different marker positions for encryption and verification. The marker is encrypted at a specific position within the packet using the content key, but during verification, the receiver extracts and decrypts the marker separately and compares it against an independently computed reference marker. This asymmetric treatment of the marker prevents false matches that would occur with symmetric verification approaches.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #4Asymmetry

Solution Approach 2:

The patent extracts the marker from the main packet content and handles it separately during verification. The receiver extracts the encrypted marker value from the packet, decrypts it independently using candidate keys, and compares it against a separately computed reference marker. This extraction and separate handling of the marker reduces the probability of random matches compared to verifying the entire packet content.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Data Source

PatentUS7882350B2Encryption and decryption method for conditional access content
Publication Date: 2011.02.01 NAGRA FRANCE SAS
  • US7882350B2 patent drawing
  • US7882350B2 patent drawing
  • US7882350B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Example embodiments relate to an encryption and decryption method for a conditional access content, including (a) extracting a marker (Mc) from a data packet (DP); (b) creating a first marking block including the marker (Mc) and a second padding value (PAD2); (c) encrypting the first marking block with a second encryption key (K2); (d) encrypting a second encrypted marking value (MK2) of the first encrypted marking block; (e) creating a mixed marking block including the second encrypted marking value (MK2) a the first encrypted padding element (PADK1); (f) decrypting the mixed marking block a device of the first encryption key (K1), in order to obtain a decrypted mixed marking block; (g) extracting a predetermined part of the decrypted mixed marking block; (h) comparing the extracted part with a reference value (Mc; PDV2); and (i) if the comparison leads to an identity, determining a new set of encryption parameters different to the first set of encryption parameters and repeating steps b) to h) in which the second set of encryption parameters is replaced by the new second set of encryption parameters.