Endpoint Security Zones Mitigate SSL Inspection Blind Spots
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current network security technologies, particularly those using SSL/TLS encryption, hinder the ability to identify and mitigate threat traffic within networks due to authentication asymmetry, making it difficult for network forensics systems to decrypt and inspect encrypted communications, and also struggle with balancing endpoint security and usability, leading to potential information leaks or compromised security.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a three-zone security architecture on endpoints, where the first zone is readable and writable for users, the second is read-only, and the third is secure and inaccessible to users, allowing sensitive information to be transferred securely between zones to prevent leaks and attacks, while enabling users to customize their systems without compromising security.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If SSL/TLS encryption is used for network communications, then security of data transmission is improved, but the ability to identify and mitigate threat traffic is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a MITM proxy as an intermediary component that establishes separate SSL/TLS connections with both the client and the server. This proxy acts as a mediator that can decrypt and inspect encrypted traffic by obtaining the server's private key, allowing security systems to monitor threat traffic while maintaining end-to-end encryption architecture.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent segments the SSL/TLS connection into two separate connections: one between the client and the MITM proxy, and another between the MITM proxy and the server. This segmentation allows the proxy to independently manage cryptographic materials for each connection, enabling decryption and inspection capabilities while preserving overall security.
2Reliability
If endpoint control is tightened for security, then security is improved, but user productivity is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the endpoint system into a secure sub-system and a user sub-system with distinct security zones. The secure sub-system (with third security zone) handles sensitive operations and cryptographic materials, while the user sub-system provides full functionality and customization. This segmentation allows users to have root access to their working environment without compromising the security of critical system components.
Solution Approach 2:
The secure sub-system acts as an intermediary that provides security services to the user sub-system. It manages cryptographic materials, enforces security policies, and protects sensitive information while allowing the user sub-system to operate with full user privileges and customization capabilities.
3Reliability
If client authentication is added to SSL/TLS, then security is improved, but compatibility with proprietary clients is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The MITM proxy serves as an intermediary that handles client authentication on behalf of the server. It establishes the SSL/TLS connection with the client using standard protocols, performs authentication verification, and then establishes a separate connection with the server. This approach adds authentication security without requiring modifications to proprietary clients, as the proxy handles the authentication logic externally.
Data Source
AI summary
A computer network endpoint is secured to prevent information leak or other compromise by instantiating in memory first, second and third security zones. With respect to an authorized user, the first zone is readable and writable, the second zone is read-only, and the third zone is neither readable nor writable. System information (e.g., applications, libraries, policies, etc.) are deployed into the first zone from the second zone. When sensitive data is generated in the first zone, e.g., when a secure communication session is established using a cryptographic key, the sensitive data is transferred from the first zone to the third zone, wherein it is immune from information leak or other compromise. The sensitive information is transferable from the third zone to one or more external having a need to know that information. Because information does not pass directly from the first security zone to the external systems, the endpoint is secured against information leak or other attack.