Gas Turbine Engine Communication With Certificate-Based Trust
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Solution Overview
Problem
The integration of secure communication and authentication of electronic components in gas turbine engines is challenging due to the risk of forged or malicious devices in the aerospace industry, necessitating robust cybersecurity measures to ensure the authenticity and integrity of components within the engine's communication system.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of digital certificates, issued by a certification authority, to validate the authenticity of electronic devices such as smart sensors and actuators, using asymmetric key pairs for secure communication sessions, and symmetric key encryption to establish trusted communication within the engine's processing system.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If digital certificates and asymmetric key pairs are implemented for authentication, then security and authenticity of components are improved, but device complexity and communication overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
Digital certificates and asymmetric key pairs are generated and distributed to electronic components before they are installed in the engine. This preliminary authentication setup allows components to prove their identity when first communicating with the control system, preventing unauthorized devices from being integrated into the network.
Solution Approach 2:
A certification authority acts as an intermediary that issues digital certificates to legitimate component manufacturers and vendors. The control system trusts certificates issued by this authority, creating a chain of trust that validates components without requiring direct verification of each device's authenticity.
2Reliability
If symmetric key encryption is used for secure communication sessions, then data integrity and confidentiality are improved, but processing time and computational energy increase
Solution Approach 1:
A symmetric session key is generated and established before actual data transmission begins. This preliminary key exchange allows subsequent communication to use fast symmetric encryption rather than computationally intensive asymmetric encryption, reducing energy consumption during operational phases.
Solution Approach 2:
The system combines asymmetric key exchange for initial authentication with symmetric key encryption for ongoing communication. This hybrid approach leverages the security benefits of asymmetric cryptography for key establishment while using the efficiency of symmetric cryptography for bulk data transmission.
3Reliability
If digital certificates are required for all electronic components, then cybersecurity is enhanced, but ease of manufacture and supply chain integration are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
A universal certification authority is established that issues standardized digital certificates applicable to all electronic components in the engine system. This single certification mechanism serves multiple functions: authenticating sensors, actuators, and control modules, while providing a common trust framework that simplifies supply chain integration.
Solution Approach 2:
Digital certificates are obtained and configured in electronic components during the manufacturing and assembly process, before the components are installed in the engine. This preliminary certification step ensures that only authenticated components can communicate with the control system, while allowing manufacturers to integrate components using standard procedures.
Data Source
AI summary
A method of communication, within a processing system of a gas turbine engine, between a first electronic component and a second electronic component, comprising: generating by the first electronic component, a request, comprising a digital certificate, intern comprising a first host public key and a first client public key, signed with a first host private key, to initiate a trusted communication session with a second electronic component; encrypting at the first electronic component, at least a portion of the request with a first client private key; transmitting the request to the second electronic component; the first host private key and the first host public key defining a first asymmetric keypair and the first client private key and the first client public key defining a second asymmetric keypair.


