Ephemeral Storage Encryption for Container Data Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
In container runtime environments, data stored on disk can remain accessible after a container is destroyed, posing a security risk as it may be read by unauthorized entities, as existing technologies fail to ensure secure deletion and encryption of ephemeral data.
Innovation Solution
The system generates a temporary encryption key stored in kernel memory, creating an encrypted ephemeral layer accessible only to the container, which is destroyed upon container shutdown, ensuring that only the container can access and encrypt data within this layer, preventing unauthorized access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If container data is stored on disk for persistence, then data availability is improved, but security is worsened because data remains accessible after container destruction
Solution Approach 1:
The patent changes the security parameter of stored data by introducing encryption. Data is encrypted on disk using encryption keys that are destroyed when containers stop, transforming the data from accessible to inaccessible state while maintaining persistence. This resolves the contradiction by allowing data to remain on disk (improving reliability) while making it unreadable without proper keys (preventing unauthorized access).
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the encryption keys from the container runtime environment and stores them separately in the host OS kernel memory. This separation means that when a container is destroyed, its data remains on disk but the key to access it is destroyed in the host kernel, effectively removing the means to access the data while preserving the data itself for potential recovery or auditing purposes.
2Ease of operation
If encryption keys are stored in host OS kernel memory, then access control is improved, but key security is worsened due to potential host compromise
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements dynamic key management where encryption keys are created, stored, and destroyed based on container lifecycle events. Keys are dynamically allocated when containers start and automatically destroyed when containers stop, creating a transient security relationship that adapts to operational needs while minimizing exposure time.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent performs preliminary encryption of container data before it is written to persistent storage. By encrypting data in advance using keys that will be destroyed afterward, the system ensures data is protected from the moment of creation, preventing any window of vulnerability where unencrypted data might exist on disk.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If temporary encryption keys are destroyed upon container stop, then security is improved, but data recovery is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a cushioning mechanism by maintaining encrypted data on disk even after key destruction. The encrypted data acts as a cushion or backup state that preserves information in an inaccessible form, allowing for potential key recovery or system restoration scenarios while maintaining security during normal operation.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent creates a copy of the encryption key in the host OS kernel memory that persists beyond the container lifecycle. This key copy serves as a recovery mechanism, allowing authorized systems to retrieve and decrypt data if needed, while the original container-specific key is destroyed to maintain security during operation.
Data Source
AI summary
Disclosed are systems and methods for encryption of an ephemeral layer of one or more containers. An exemplary method comprises detecting a container starting execution in an operating system, generating a temporary encryption key and storing the temporary encryption key in memory of a kernel of the operating system, creating an encrypted area as the ephemeral layer in a storage device, the encrypted area accessible only by the container, providing to the container access to the encrypted area, and responsive to stopping execution of the container, destroying the temporary encryption key.