Event Graph Root Cause Identification for Malware Forensics

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current forensic analysis techniques face challenges in identifying the root cause of security compromises and distinguishing malicious computing activity from normal processes in complex environments, especially as malware becomes more sophisticated.

Innovation Solution

A system that records endpoint activity as sequences of causally related events, generates an event graph, and applies cause identification rules to traverse the graph in reverse and forward orders to identify the root cause of security events and affected objects.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If traditional forensic analysis techniques are used, then the analysis process is simple, but the ability to identify root causes of security compromises deteriorates in complex computing environments

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveroot cause identification accuracyVSAvoidcomputing environment complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system segments the complex computing environment into discrete computing objects (processes, files, registry keys, network connections) and tracks their individual causal relationships. This segmentation allows the complex environment to be managed through structured, manageable units rather than monolithic complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces a temporal dimension by recording sequences of events and establishing causal relationships over time. The event graph adds a relational dimension, mapping not just what happened but how events connect causally, enabling root cause analysis across multiple dimensions of complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

2Reliability

If comprehensive monitoring of all computing objects is implemented, then the detection capability improves, but the system overhead and performance impact worsen

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity event detection capabilityVSAvoidendpoint monitoring resource consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The system monitors all computing objects (processes, files, registry keys, network connections) comprehensively, accepting that some monitoring overhead is necessary. The key differentiator is that this comprehensive monitoring is structured around causal relationships, allowing the system to focus on what matters for security analysis rather than generic monitoring of everything.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Solution Approach 2:

The system performs preliminary action by continuously recording sequences of events and building the event graph structure in advance. This preparation allows rapid root cause analysis when security events occur, reducing the need for intensive real-time analysis during actual incidents.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Speed

If real-time analysis of all recorded events is performed, then the response speed to security events improves, but the processing load and latency worsen

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity event response speedVSAvoidevent processing computational load
Core Design Contradiction:
SpeedVSPower

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary action by continuously recording events and maintaining the event graph structure in advance. When a security event is detected, the graph is already prepared and indexed, allowing rapid traversal and analysis without the need for real-time processing of all historical events.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

Instead of analyzing all recorded events from the beginning when a security incident occurs, the system inverts the approach by using the pre-built event graph to quickly navigate from the security event backward to identify root causes. This reverse traversal through the structured graph dramatically reduces processing requirements compared to sequential analysis of all events.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

Data Source

PatentUS11550909B2Tracking malicious software movement with an event graph
Publication Date: 2023.01.10 SOPHOS LTD
  • US11550909B2 patent drawing
  • US11550909B2 patent drawing
  • US11550909B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A multi-endpoint event graph is used to detect malware based on malicious software moving through a network.