Exclusive Execution Environment for SoC DSP Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current computing systems with System-on-a-Chip (SoC) architectures, such as those using TrustZone, face challenges in protecting the digital signal processor (DSP) execution environment from compromised components, especially in minimally-equipped devices like IoT devices that lack resources to implement full trust systems.
Innovation Solution
Establishing an exclusive execution environment (E3) that prohibits access by trusted execution environment components, allowing components outside this environment to access and manage secure memory domains without mutual trust, using mechanisms like the 'Claim' and 'VerifyClaim' functions, and employing hardware and firmware to enforce exclusivity.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If TrustZone or similar trusted execution environment components are used to protect execution environments, then security against unauthorized access is improved, but device complexity and resource requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the execution environment into distinct segments: a trusted execution environment (TEE) and an exclusive execution environment (EEE). The EEE is further segmented into exclusive memory regions that are isolated from TEE components. This segmentation allows security-critical functions to be isolated without requiring the entire system to implement full TrustZone complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the essential security function from the complex TrustZone system by creating a simplified exclusive execution environment that only implements the necessary memory isolation and access control mechanisms. This extraction removes unnecessary complexity while retaining the core security benefit of protecting sensitive execution environments.
2Reliability
If full TrustZone or Hypervisor implementations are used to provide trusted execution environment protections, then security against compromised components is improved, but resource consumption increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements partial action by providing only the essential security features needed for protecting the exclusive execution environment, rather than implementing the complete TrustZone or Hypervisor stack. This includes implementing memory isolation and access control without the full overhead of virtualization or comprehensive trusted execution infrastructure, thereby reducing resource consumption while maintaining adequate security.
3Reliability
If memory is designated as exclusive execution environment domain forbidden to trusted execution environment components, then security of DSP execution environment is improved, but access flexibility is reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements dynamic access control where the exclusive execution environment can selectively grant or revoke access permissions to specific memory regions based on operational requirements. The system can dynamically transition between exclusive access modes and shared access modes, allowing flexible adaptation to different security and performance needs while maintaining the ability to enforce exclusivity when required.
Data Source
AI summary
Exemplary features pertain to establishing an Exclusive Execution Environment domain that Trusted Execution Zone components are forbidden to access. In one example, a system-on-a-chip (SoC) is equipped with a Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) processor along with an application DSP (ADSP) and/or Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), where the ADSP and/or GPU is configured to provide and enforce the Exclusive Execution Environment domain. By forbidding access to Trusted Execution Zone components, security can be enhanced, especially within minimally-equipped devices that do not have the resources to implement a full Trust Execution Environment, such as low-power devices associated with the Internet of Things (IoT). Among other features, the systems and methods described herein allow application clients to build exclusive execution environments and claim exclusive access to buffer objects and hardware resource groups. Method and apparatus examples are provided.