Failure Domain-Specific Cryptographic Keys for Storage Drive Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
Storage drives face challenges with partial failures, where a portion of the drive becomes non-functional, leading to security vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in data access and management, as traditional remanufacture processes either require discarding the entire drive or leaving legacy data accessible.
Innovation Solution
Implementing failure domain-specific cryptographic keys that are uniquely associated with each failure domain within a storage drive, allowing for granular control over data access by deleting the corresponding key upon detection of a failure, thereby isolating and securing legacy data during the remanufacturing process.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional remanufacture processes are used when a portion of the drive fails, then the entire drive must be discarded or legacy data remains accessible, but this leads to loss of functional drive capacity or security vulnerabilities
Solution Approach 1:
The drive is divided into multiple failure domains, each with its own cryptographic key. When a failure occurs in one domain, only that specific domain's key is deleted, isolating the affected portion while preserving access to and operation of other domains. This segmentation allows the drive to maintain partial functionality while ensuring security in failed regions.
Solution Approach 2:
Different cryptographic keys are applied to different failure domains within the drive, creating local security zones. This allows security measures to be applied specifically to affected regions without impacting the entire drive, enabling selective key deletion and preserving operational capacity in unaffected domains.
2Adaptability or versatility
If failure domain-specific cryptographic keys are implemented, then granular control over data access is achieved, but this increases system complexity
Solution Approach 1:
The cryptographic key management system is segmented into multiple failure domain-specific keys rather than using a single root key for the entire drive. This segmentation enables granular control over data access by domain, allowing independent management of each failure domain's security while maintaining overall system functionality.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If the cryptographic key for a failed failure domain is deleted, then access to legacy data in that domain is prevented, but this requires additional key management infrastructure
Solution Approach 1:
The key store is organized to contain multiple failure domain-specific cryptographic keys rather than a single root key. This segmentation allows the system to delete only the specific key associated with a failed domain, preventing access to legacy data in that domain while maintaining access to data in other domains, thus reducing security vulnerabilities without requiring complete drive replacement.
Data Source
AI summary
Failure-domain-specific cryptographic keys for use in control of access to data within failure domains of a storage drive. A unique failure domain-specific cryptographic key may be associated with each of a plurality of failure domains in a storage drive. The failure domains may correspond to any portion of the storage media of a drive that is susceptible to failure while leaving other portions of the storage drive functional. In turn, upon detection of a condition associated with a failure (e.g., an actual or predicted failure) of a failure domain, the associated failure domain-specific cryptographic key may be deleted to preclude further access to data in the failed failure domain. Deletion of the failure domain-specific cryptographic key may be before or after data in the failed failure domain is rebuilt in another portion of a storage drive that is functional.