Digital Fault Injection Detection Chain for Secure ICs
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing electronic circuitry is vulnerable to fault injection attacks, which involve altering the logical state of circuits to compromise security, and current detection methods are inadequate in effectively mitigating these attacks.
Innovation Solution
A secure Integrated Circuit (IC) is designed with a chain of digital detection cells and protection logic, where detection cells toggle outputs to propagate pulses along the chain, triggering a responsive action upon detecting fault injection attacks, utilizing standard cells and coils for enhanced sensitivity to electromagnetic and optical attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If detection cells are configured with asymmetric drive-strength to enhance fault injection detection sensitivity, then detection sensitivity is improved, but circuit complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by configuring different drive-strength characteristics in different detection cells. Specifically, even detection cells have inverters with stronger drive-strength for driving a first logic level, while odd detection cells have inverters with stronger drive-strength for driving a second logic level. This localized asymmetry enhances the ability to detect fault injection attacks while maintaining overall circuit functionality.
2Reliability
If a chain of detection cells is used to propagate fault injection detection signals, then detection reliability is improved, but response time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the detection function into multiple detection cells connected in a chain, where each cell contributes to the overall detection reliability. The chain structure allows fault injection detection signals to be propagated through multiple stages, improving reliability by requiring multiple cells to confirm a fault condition before triggering a security response.
Solution Approach 2:
The detection cells operate in a periodic manner, with each cell toggling its output state in response to detected faults and propagating the signal along the chain. This periodic toggling action enables the system to maintain continuous monitoring while managing response timing through the structured propagation sequence.
3Measurement precision
If detection cells are made more sensitive to optical fault-injection by increasing active area, then detection capability is improved, but vulnerability to optical attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by creating asymmetric drive-strength configurations in detection cells, where even and odd cells have different inverter characteristics. This asymmetry creates a detection mechanism that is sensitive to abnormal logic level transitions caused by optical fault injection, while the structured chain propagation ensures that only coordinated attacks affecting multiple cells trigger false positives.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
The solution effectively detects and responds to fault injection attacks, ensuring the security of functional circuitry by propagating pulses through the chain to initiate protective measures, thereby enhancing the reliability and sensitivity of the detection system.
Implementation Method 1
the coil coupled to the inverter is disposed over the active area and shaped to guide optical radiation to the active area
Implementation Method 2
the inverter has an active area that is sensitive to optical fault-injection
Data Source
AI summary
A secure Integrated Circuit (IC) includes functional circuitry, and protection circuitry configured to protect the functional circuitry against fault-injection attacks. The protection circuitry includes a plurality of digital detection cells, and protection logic. The detection cells have respective inputs and outputs and are connected output-to-input in at least a chain. In response to a fault-injection attack, a given detection cell in the chain is configured to toggle an output that drives an input of a subsequent detection cell in the chain, thereby causing a pulse to propagate along the chain. The protection logic is configured to receive the pulse from the chain and initiate a responsive action.