Fault-to-Time Converter Sensor for Low-Overhead Fault Attack Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Integrated circuits, particularly in IoT systems, are vulnerable to fault-injection attacks that can bypass security mechanisms and compromise data integrity or cause denial of service, with existing countermeasures being costly and resource-intensive, and lacking a universal, low-overhead solution for detecting multiple types of fault injection attacks.
Innovation Solution
A fault-to-time converter (FTC) sensor is implemented, utilizing high voltage threshold (HVT) and low voltage threshold (LVT) cells to detect fault injection attacks by converting physical consequences of faults into measurable time deviations, allowing for universal detection of various fault injection techniques with minimal overhead.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing countermeasures are used to protect integrated circuits from fault injection attacks, then security is improved, but area, power, and performance overhead increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses HVT and LVT cells with different voltage thresholds to detect fault injection attacks. By monitoring timing parameter changes in these cells under different voltage conditions, the system can identify attacks without requiring complex protection circuits. This parameter-based detection approach reduces area and power overhead compared to traditional redundant hardware methods.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces complex mechanical/protection hardware systems with a sensor-based detection system that uses standard HVT and LVT cells already present in the circuit. Instead of adding substantial protection hardware, the system substitutes a lightweight sensing mechanism that leverages existing circuit components to detect attacks through timing analysis.
2Reliability
If existing fault injection countermeasures are implemented, then attack detection capability is improved, but resource usage and implementation cost increase
Solution Approach 1:
The FTC sensor system uses the HVT and LVT cells' inherent timing characteristics to detect attacks without requiring external monitoring hardware. The cells essentially monitor themselves by comparing their natural timing behavior under normal versus attacked conditions, eliminating the need for additional active monitoring resources.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent makes the HVT and LVT cells serve dual purposes: their primary function in the circuit operation plus their secondary function as sensors for attack detection. This multi-functionality allows the system to gain attack detection capability without adding dedicated detection hardware, thereby reducing resource usage and implementation cost.
3Adaptability or versatility
If a universal fault injection detection solution is implemented, then versatility against multiple attack types is improved, but device complexity and overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The FTC sensor provides universal detection coverage against multiple fault injection attack types (clock glitching, voltage glitching, optical/laser attacks) by monitoring the fundamental timing behavior of HVT and LVT cells. This single sensor structure handles diverse attack types without requiring separate detection mechanisms for each, thereby maintaining low complexity while achieving high versatility.
Data Source
AI summary
Various embodiments of the present disclosure provide fault injection attack mitigation for an integrated circuit. In one example, an embodiment provides for providing a sampling clock signal to both high voltage threshold (HVT) cells and low voltage threshold (LVT) cells of a fault-to-time converter sensor of an integrated circuit, providing output of the HVT cells and the LVT cells to an encoder stage of the fault-to-time converter sensor, and detecting one or more fault injection attacks with respect to the integrated circuit based on output of the encoder stage.