Secret Key Extraction via Channel Characteristics in FDD Wireless Systems

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Solution Overview

Problem

Wireless communication systems face challenges in implementing physical layer protection when channel reciprocity is not assumed, particularly in frequency division duplexing (FDD) systems, as existing secret key extraction techniques rely on reciprocity present in time division duplexing (TDD) systems.

Innovation Solution

The method involves a transmitting device and a receiving device obtaining a secret key based on channel characteristics like doppler spread or delay spread by transmitting reference signals, estimating these characteristics, and generating the same secret key using a secret key generator, allowing physical layer protection even in scenarios without channel reciprocity.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If secret key extraction techniques relying on channel reciprocity are used, then physical layer protection can be implemented in TDD systems, but these techniques cannot be applied in FDD systems where channel reciprocity does not hold

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveapplicability of secret key extractionVSAvoidphysical layer protection
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent changes the fundamental parameter from which secret keys are extracted - moving from channel reciprocity (which requires bidirectional channel consistency) to channel characteristics such as Doppler spread, delay spread, or Doppler shift that can be independently measured and matched between transmitter and receiver without requiring reciprocity. This enables secret key extraction in FDD systems while maintaining reliability of physical layer protection.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Adaptability or versatility

If channel characteristics are used for secret key generation without reciprocity assumption, then FDD systems can achieve physical layer protection, but additional signaling and coordination between transmitter and receiver are required

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesupport for FDD operationsVSAvoidsignaling coordination
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent performs preliminary channel estimation and characteristic extraction during the uplink phase, where the receiver measures channel characteristics from uplink reference signals and reports quantized values to the transmitter. This preliminary action enables the transmitter to generate matching secret keys without requiring complex real-time coordination during downlink transmission, reducing overall signaling complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces quantized channel characteristic values as an intermediary between the physical channel and the secret key generation process. These quantized values serve as a common reference that both transmitter and receiver can independently derive from their respective channel measurements, facilitating synchronized key generation without direct channel reciprocity or complex coordination protocols.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS20250016556A1Secret key extraction for physical layer protection in a wireless communications system
Publication Date: 2025.01.09 QUALCOMM INC
  • US20250016556A1 patent drawing
  • US20250016556A1 patent drawing
  • US20250016556A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. In some examples, the method may include a user equipment (UE) transmitting, to a base station, first reference signals. The base station may perform channel estimation using the first reference signals and estimate a value for an uplink channel based on the channel estimation. The base station may generate second reference signals such that a characteristic of a downlink channel seen by the UE is within a target value and transmit the second reference signals to the UE. The UE may estimate a value for the characteristic of the downlink channel and obtain the target value from the estimated value. Both the UE and the base station may generate a secret using the target value and utilize the secret key for physical layer protection.