Filtering Algorithm for Implantable Medical Device Security

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Solution Overview

Problem

The use of mobile devices as external controllers for implantable medical devices increases the risk of cyber attacks and unintended corruption, potentially leading to improper programming of implantable medical devices, which can harm patients due to their insecure nature and complex functionality.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a filtering algorithm within the implantable medical device or external devices that communicate with it, comprising a firewall and instruction analysis modules, to review and filter incoming blocks based on predefined rules, ensuring only compliant instructions are executed, thereby enhancing security and protecting the device from potential corruption.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If mobile devices are used as external controllers for implantable medical devices, then ease of operation and accessibility are improved, but security and reliability deteriorate due to increased risk of cyber attacks and unintended corruption

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of operationVSAvoidreliability
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

A filtering algorithm is introduced as an intermediary layer between the mobile device and the implantable medical device. This algorithm acts as a security mediator that receives communications from external devices, evaluates them against predefined rules, and only permits compliant communications to reach the implantable device, thereby protecting against cyber attacks while maintaining ease of operation

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The filtering algorithm performs preliminary security evaluation of incoming communications before they reach the implantable medical device. By pre-screening and validating communications against security rules in advance, the system prevents potentially harmful communications from executing, thus maintaining reliability without compromising user accessibility

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If comprehensive security filtering is implemented in the implantable medical device, then security and protection from corruption are improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovereliabilityVSAvoiddevice complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The security filtering function is segmented from the main implantable medical device operations. The filtering algorithm operates as a separate, dedicated security layer that independently evaluates communications without interfering with core medical functions, thereby enhancing reliability while minimizing impact on device complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The filtering algorithm uses a copy of the communication data for evaluation purposes rather than directly processing the original communication stream. This copying approach allows security validation without altering the fundamental communication architecture, maintaining reliability while avoiding excessive complexity in the implantable device

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Data Source

PatentUS20240424311A1Filtering Algorithm for Assessing Communications Wirelessly Received by an Implantable Medical Device
Publication Date: 2024.12.26 BOSTON SCI NEUROMODULATION CORP
  • US20240424311A1 patent drawing
  • US20240424311A1 patent drawing
  • US20240424311A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A filtering algorithm implemented by a filtering module in an implantable medical device (IMD), or in an external device for communicating with an IMD, is disclosed which reviews blocks based on a number of rules. The filtering module preferably comprises both firewall and instruction analysis modules. The instruction analysis module analyzes the instructions and associated data (if present) in each block to determine whether such blocks would compromise operation of the IPG or injure a patient if executed. Instruction rules corresponding to an instruction identified in the block are retrieved by the instruction analysis module. The instruction analysis module reviews the block per the retrieved rules, and possibly also in light of current and historical IPG therapy setting or mode data, or other received but un-executed blocks. If a block is compliant, it is executed by the IMD or transmitted to the IMD.