Embedded Firmware Forensics Module for Selective Secure Verification
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Current technologies lack effective protection concepts for firmware in embedded systems, making them vulnerable to targeted attacks, which pose a high risk to critical infrastructures and complicate conventional investigation due to hardware embedding and conflicting interests among manufacturers and authorities.
Innovation Solution
A forensics module is provided to extract and emulate tampered firmware, ensuring bit-accurate extraction and examination in a suitable environment, addressing the requirements of all parties involved.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Difficulty of detecting and measuring
If conventional investigation techniques are applied to firmware manipulation, then investigation can be conducted, but the embedding of firmware in hardware makes investigation difficult and complex
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the firmware image from the embedded hardware system and creates a standalone emulation environment that can be analyzed independently. This separation allows conventional forensic investigation techniques to be applied without being constrained by the hardware embedding complexity, while preserving the original firmware state for analysis.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent creates a bit-accurate copy (forensic image) of the firmware stored in non-volatile memory. This copy can be loaded into the emulation environment for analysis without modifying the original firmware in the hardware system, enabling investigation while maintaining the original state intact.
2Loss of information
If comprehensive firmware examination is performed to meet investigating authority requirements, then investigation completeness is improved, but manufacturer company secrets may be exposed
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements selective disclosure mechanisms where different portions of the firmware can be examined based on predefined criteria. The emulation environment allows investigation of specific areas (such as malicious code detection) while maintaining the ability to protect sensitive manufacturer information through controlled access and analysis scopes.
Solution Approach 2:
The emulation environment serves as an intermediary layer between the firmware and the investigating authority. It provides a controlled environment where firmware can be examined for security purposes while the manufacturer retains control over what information is disclosed and how it is analyzed, preventing direct exposure of company secrets.
3Measurement precision
If firmware extraction is performed with bit accuracy for forensic purposes, then measurement precision is improved, but the complexity and time required for extraction increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary actions during system operation by continuously monitoring for security events and automatically triggering forensic extraction when anomalies are detected. This pre-prepared state and automated initiation reduces the time required for extraction compared to manual post-incident analysis, while maintaining bit-accurate precision through dedicated extraction hardware and software tools.
Data Source
AI summary
According to various embodiments, a forensics module (250) for an embedded system may comprise: a secured memory area (202s) comprising first data implementing a key (305s); an interface (208) for reading (301) second data (302) representing a system state of the embedded system (150); and one or more than one processor (204) configured to: read (301) the second data (302) by means of the interface (208), wherein the second data (302) comprises a plurality of data sets; determine (303) a commitment (310) to a plurality of aperture values, each aperture value being associated with exactly one of the plurality of data sets, based on the second data (302) and using a cryptographic commitment process configured such that each data set may be individually verified using the commitment (310) and the respective associated aperture value; encrypt (305) the second data (302) and the plurality of aperture values using the key (305s).