Flexible Attestation Key Provisioning in Secure Enclaves

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing communication security measures are ineffective against malicious actors who employ techniques like spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks, as they fail to establish a trusted relationship between systems, especially when sensitive data is transmitted over networks.

Innovation Solution

The implementation of a secure attestation system using secure enclaves and attestation keys, where a provisioning system securely provisions attestation keys on host devices, allowing applications to attest to their trustworthiness and establish secure communication channels through cryptographic verification.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If traditional encryption and authentication are used to secure communications, then communication security is provided, but the system cannot establish trusted relationships against sophisticated attacks like spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetrustworthiness verificationVSAvoidspoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary attestation of the application's code and environment before establishing communication channels. The secure enclave verifies the application's identity and trustworthiness in advance, ensuring that only authenticated applications can access sensitive data or communicate securely, thereby preventing spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks before they can occur

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

A secure enclave acts as an intermediary between the application and the communication channel. The enclave serves as a trusted mediator that verifies the application's identity through attestation and manages cryptographic keys, preventing direct exposure of sensitive authentication mechanisms to potential attackers while establishing verified trust relationships

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If secure enclaves with attestation keys are implemented to establish trusted relationships, then trustworthiness verification is improved, but the device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveattestation verificationVSAvoidsecure enclave provisioning system
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The complex cryptographic key management and attestation verification functions are extracted into a dedicated secure enclave component. This separation isolates the complexity within a specialized hardware module, allowing the main system to interact with the enclave through simplified interfaces while benefiting from the enclave's sophisticated security capabilities

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The secure enclave performs self-attestation by automatically verifying its own integrity and generating cryptographic proofs of its trusted state. This self-service capability eliminates the need for external verification mechanisms, reducing system complexity while maintaining high reliability through the enclave's inherent security features

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS10880097B2Flexible provisioning of attestation keys in secure enclaves
Publication Date: 2020.12.29 INTEL CORP
  • US10880097B2 patent drawing
  • US10880097B2 patent drawing
  • US10880097B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A computing platform implements one or more secure enclaves including a first provisioning enclave to interface with a first provisioning service to obtain a first attestation key from the first provisioning service, a second provisioning enclave to interface with a different, second provisioning service to obtain a second attestation key from the second provisioning service, and a provisioning certification enclave to sign first data from the first provisioning enclave and second data from the second provisioning enclave using a hardware-based provisioning attestation key. The signed first data is used by the first provisioning enclave to authenticate to the first provisioning service to obtain the first attestation key and the signed second data is used by the second provisioning enclave to authenticate to the second provisioning service to obtain the second attestation key.