Footprint Data Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) transactions are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, such as relay and replay attacks, due to the ease of establishing connections without authentication, allowing fraudsters to intercept and manipulate access requests.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a method where access devices and user devices receive and verify timestamped and uniquely identified broadcast messages from multiple beacon transmitters, creating a unique footprint that must match for access requests to be authenticated, thereby preventing fraudulent intercepts.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If BLE transactions use simple connection establishment without authentication, then ease of operation is improved, but reliability deteriorates due to susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by having the access device receive and store multiple timestamped broadcast messages from beacon transmitters before the actual access request. This creates a baseline footprint of legitimate beacon signals that will be used for comparison during authentication, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks while maintaining ease of use.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes parameters by incorporating timestamps and unique identifiers from multiple beacon transmitters into the authentication process. By verifying that the access request contains matching timestamps and identifiers against the stored footprint, the system ensures the device is at the correct location at the correct time, thereby improving security without complicating the user experience.
2Reliability
If the access device verifies multiple timestamped broadcast messages from beacon transmitters, then reliability is improved by preventing fraudulent attacks, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the authentication process into distinct components: receiving broadcast messages with unique identifiers and timestamps, storing them as a footprint, receiving the access request with corresponding data, and verifying the match. This segmentation allows each component to be handled independently, managing complexity while ensuring comprehensive security verification.
3Measurement precision
If the system requires matching timestamps and unique identifiers from multiple beacons, then measurement precision is improved for location verification, but loss of time increases due to verification processes
Solution Approach 1:
The system uses periodic broadcast messages from beacon transmitters that include timestamps. By requiring the access request to contain matching timestamps from multiple periodic broadcasts, the system achieves precise location and time verification. The periodic nature of the broadcasts allows for efficient comparison without requiring continuous monitoring, thus minimizing time loss while maintaining high measurement precision.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods are disclosed for preventing relay or replay attacks using time-stamped, localized footprint data. An access device may receive, from one or more beacon transmitters, a plurality of broadcast messages, each broadcast message, of the plurality of broadcast messages, comprising a timestamp and a unique identifier for a beacon transmitter, of the one or more beacon transmitters. The access device may store the timestamps and the unique identifiers. The access device may receive, from a user device, an access request comprising timestamps and unique identifiers corresponding to a subset of the broadcast messages received by the access device. The access device may verify that the stored timestamps and unique identifiers match the timestamps and unique identifiers received from the user device. Based on the verifying, the access device may authenticate the access request.