Fine Time Measurement Timestamp Authentication Against Spoofing
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
The Fine Time Measurement (FTM) protocol for indoor positioning is vulnerable to 'man in the middle' attacks, where unencrypted FTM messages are intercepted and spoofed, leading to inaccurate location calculations.
Innovation Solution
Employing a secure side channel separate from the FTM message transmission to transmit authenticating values, such as hash values, to verify the timestamps and detect hacking or spoofing.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If FTM messages are transmitted unencrypted for indoor positioning, then positioning functionality is achieved, but vulnerability to man in the middle attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
A hash function acts as an intermediary mechanism that processes FTM timestamps and transmits authenticated values through a separate channel. This mediator verifies timestamp authenticity without requiring encryption of the original FTM messages, thus maintaining positioning functionality while preventing man in the middle attacks.
Solution Approach 2:
The authentication mechanism is segmented from the main FTM message transmission. Instead of encrypting the entire FTM protocol, the patent separates the authentication function by transmitting only hashed timestamp values through a dedicated channel, reducing security overhead while maintaining positioning capabilities.
2Reliability
If FTM timestamps are authenticated using a separate channel, then security against spoofing is improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication function is extracted from the FTM message structure itself and implemented as a separate, independent mechanism. Only the essential timestamp data is hashed and transmitted through the additional channel, rather than encrypting the entire FTM protocol, thus minimizing added complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the parameter of data representation by transforming raw timestamps into hashed authentication values. This parameter transformation enables authentication without requiring complex encryption operations, reducing computational complexity while maintaining security.
3Reliability
If FTM messages are encrypted to prevent spoofing, then security is improved, but measurement accuracy may be degraded
Solution Approach 1:
The hash function serves as an intermediary that preserves the original timestamp values for measurement while adding authentication. Since hashing is a one-way transformation that doesn't alter the underlying time data, measurement precision is maintained while security is improved through separate authentication channel.
Data Source
AI summary
A Fine Time Measurement (FTM) authentication system and method include performing a FTM transaction comprising at least one FTM-ACK message pair transmitted and received via a first communication channel between two endpoints, where the at least one FTM-ACK message pair contains timestamp values of message departure time and message arrival time during the FTM transaction. At least one authenticating value indicative of timestamp values of the at least one FTM-ACK message pair arrival and departure times during the FTM transaction is then transmitted via a second communication channel. FTM timestamp values are recovered from the received at least one authenticating value, which are compared with the received FTM timestamp values. The received FTM timestamp values can be authenticated if there is a match between the recovered FTM timestamp values and the received FTM timestamp values.