Gadget Container Signature Verification for Secure Library Access
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for securing gadget access to libraries on the Web fail to balance public access with enhanced security, particularly against spamming, as they either restrict development or do not adequately verify the origin and integrity of software features.
Innovation Solution
A method utilizing a public/private key encryption system to securely authorize access to library features by verifying the signature of a gadget's primary file, ensuring only authorized and intact files can implement features, while maintaining open standards for development.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If access to libraries is limited to prevent spamming, then security is improved, but gadget development freedom and public access are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by verifying the gadget's signature against authorized developer public keys before allowing access to the library. This pre-verification mechanism ensures that only gadgets from trusted developers can access library features, preventing spamming while maintaining development freedom for authorized developers. The signature verification is performed in advance, so the actual library access is secure without restricting legitimate development.
2Reliability
If gadget code is deeply checked by the container owner, then security is improved, but development complexity and time are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the security verification function from the gadget container and implements it in the gadget code itself through digital signatures. Instead of the container owner performing deep code checks, the gadget carries its own signature that proves its origin. This shifts the security burden from complex runtime analysis to simple signature verification, reducing development complexity while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces digital signatures as an intermediary mechanism between the developer and the container. Rather than direct code inspection, the signature serves as a trusted intermediary that verifies the gadget's origin and integrity. This intermediary approach simplifies the security process while maintaining trust, as the container only needs to verify signatures rather than analyze gadget code deeply.
3Reliability
If public key encryption is implemented for signature verification, then security is improved, but processing time and computational overhead are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by pre-computing and embedding the digital signature in the gadget during development. The signature is generated once using the developer's private key and attached to the gadget code. At runtime, the container only needs to verify this pre-computed signature using the developer's public key, which is computationally efficient compared to performing encryption operations. This preliminary signature generation eliminates repeated computational overhead during gadget execution.
Data Source
Figure 1~3
AI summary
The invention relates to a method for securing the operation of a gadget requiring access to features hosted in a library (44) of a gadget container (36) in order to implement these features into a primary file (35) of such gadget, the primary file (35) being sent by a Web hosting server (40) to the gadget container (36) to allow the implementation of the features with the primary file (35), wherein: - the gadget container (36) retrieves the primary file (35) of the gadget from the Web hosting server (40) with a signature (16), based on a public key /private key encryption system, associated therein, - the gadget container (36) verifies with a public key of the public/private key encryption system, the signature (16) associated to the gadget primary file, - the gadget container (36) decides to authorize or to refuse the implementation of its library (44) features depending on whether the signature (16) associated with the primary file (35) is accepted or refused.