Private Wireless Gateway Anti-Spoofing via Rolling Code Authentication
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Private wireless gateways face security vulnerabilities due to spoofing of authentication information and preferred roaming lists (PRLs), allowing malicious entities to gain unauthorized access to service provider networks, which is not easily detectable and can lead to repeated unauthorized access.
Innovation Solution
Implementing rolling codes and secret algorithms to authenticate communication devices, where devices provisioned with a secret function and rolling code data can generate and verify access values, preventing fraudulent access by ensuring only legitimate devices can provide the correct access values, and using blockchain technology to securely manage rolling code data.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional authentication methods are used, then devices can access the network, but security vulnerabilities arise due to spoofing of authentication information and PRLs
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements dynamic authentication by using rolling codes that change with each authentication attempt. Instead of static authentication values, the system generates time-varying access values based on a secret function and rolling code data, making spoofed credentials invalid after a single use. This dynamic approach prevents replay attacks and enhances network security against spoofing.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the authentication parameter from static to dynamic by introducing rolling codes. The access value is no longer a fixed credential but a parameter that evolves with each authentication attempt through the secret function. This parameter transformation ensures that even if authentication information is intercepted, it cannot be reused, thereby preventing spoofing attacks.
2Reliability
If complex authentication protocols are implemented, then security is improved, but computational resources required increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the computationally intensive cryptographic operations from the IoT device and relocates them to the network side (gateway or server). The device only needs to perform simple operations like generating a rolling code based on a seed value and comparing access values, while the complex secret function computations are performed remotely. This extraction reduces the computational burden on resource-constrained devices while maintaining strong security.
Solution Approach 2:
The system introduces an intermediary authentication mechanism where a gateway or server acts as a mediator between the IoT device and the network. The intermediary handles the complex authentication logic and secret function computations, while the device simply provides rolling code data and receives authentication decisions. This intermediary approach allows strong security without burdening the device's computational resources.
3Reliability
If rolling codes and secret algorithms are used, then PRL spoofing is prevented, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication system is segmented into distinct functional components: the IoT device handles rolling code generation and access value computation, the gateway handles authentication verification and PRL validation, and the network core handles authorization. This segmentation allows each component to have simplified, focused functionality rather than requiring the full complex authentication logic in every device, reducing overall system complexity while maintaining security.
Data Source
AI summary
A mechanism of authenticating a communication device onto a radio access network via a private wireless gateway is described. This includes communicating with a communication device via a first wireless interface authentication information, a preferred roaming list (PRL), and an initial access value are obtained from the communication device. A first expected access value is determined based on rolling code data and a secret function. The PRL is authenticated when the first expected access value matches the initial access value. The communication device is proxied onto a radio access network via a second wireless interface. The proxying includes providing the authentication information and the PRL to a cell site attached to the radio access network.