GHASH IP Core Architecture for Side-Channel-Resistant GCM
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Existing computer hardware is vulnerable to side channel attacks such as differential power analysis, simple power analysis, and fault injection, which can compromise cryptographic key extraction, and there is a need for improved resistance and performance in cryptographic operations.
Innovation Solution
Implementing IP cores and methods that enhance resistance to side channel attacks by preventing the learning stage in HMAC and block ciphers, defending GCM Authentication against such attacks, optimizing exponentiation algorithms, limiting polynomial degrees in finite field multiplications, and simulating fault injection responses in circuit design.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If cryptographic operations are implemented in hardware to improve performance, then processing speed increases, but vulnerability to side channel attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The cryptographic processing is divided into multiple independent shares or instances. Each share processes a portion of the cryptographic operation independently, and the final result is obtained by combining the shares. This segmentation prevents attackers from obtaining complete information through side channel measurements of a single processing instance.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the operational parameters by introducing randomization into the cryptographic processing. Random values are injected into intermediate calculations, causing the power consumption patterns and timing characteristics to vary between operations even when processing the same data, thereby masking the actual cryptographic operations from side channel attackers.
2Reliability
If security measures are added to protect against side channel attacks, then resistance to attacks improves, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements security mechanisms that serve multiple functions simultaneously. The same shared structure that provides security against side channel attacks also enables parallel processing capabilities, improving both security and performance without proportionally increasing complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
Instead of creating completely separate secure processing units, the patent uses copying techniques where multiple shares replicate the same cryptographic algorithm structure. Each share is a simplified copy that processes a portion of the data, reducing the complexity of individual components while maintaining overall security through the collective system.
3Adaptability or versatility
If arbitrary data inputs are allowed in HMAC to improve functionality, then versatility increases, but resistance to template attacks decreases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary protective measures by restricting the input data to specific formats or pre-processing inputs before they reach the HMAC core. This preliminary action prevents attackers from using arbitrary inputs to perform template attacks, while still maintaining versatility for legitimate use cases through controlled input interfaces.
Data Source
AI summary
In a general aspect, a GHASH semiconductor intellectual property (IP) core can include circuitry for calculating a GHASH function. The IP core can be configured to calculate the GHASH function by calculating the following quantities:X0=0;Xi+1=HkXi+∑ j=0k-1∑ n=0m-1Cki+jhijn,where for any i and j; and∑ n=0m-1hijn=Hj,where k>1 and m>1.