Glass-Shielded Chip Package for IC Tamper Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Integrated circuits (ICs) are vulnerable to tampering techniques such as micro-probing and fault injection, especially since the backside of flip chip packages is exposed, allowing for potential attacks on the power structure and interconnects between dies.
Innovation Solution
A chip package is designed with a selective glass-based shield disposed on the IC die above the security asset, which prevents access to the security asset. Additionally, an oxide layer can be included between the glass shield and the IC die as an insulator, and an active shield system with a detection module and wire mesh can be used to monitor for tampering by comparing serial bit streams.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of manufacture
If the backside of the IC die is exposed for flip chip packaging, then ease of manufacture and heat dissipation are improved, but security vulnerability increases due to accessibility for micro-probing and fault injection attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The backside of the IC die is segmented into protected and unprotected regions. A glass shield is selectively formed over specific high-security areas (such as power structures and security assets) while leaving other areas exposed for normal packaging operations. This allows manufacturing to proceed as usual while providing targeted protection against probing attacks on critical structures.
Solution Approach 2:
A glass shield is introduced as an intermediary layer between potential attackers and the vulnerable backside structures of the IC die. This glass layer physically blocks micro-probing needles and fault injection attempts while maintaining the overall flip chip packaging structure and functionality. The glass acts as a mediator that preserves manufacturing ease while eliminating security vulnerabilities.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If a complete glass shield is placed over the entire IC die, then security protection is improved, but manufacturing complexity and device functionality are worsened due to heat dissipation and interconnect access issues
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of applying uniform glass shielding across the entire IC die, the glass shield is applied selectively only to specific high-security regions. This local quality approach ensures that critical security assets and power structures are protected while leaving other areas accessible for normal heat dissipation, electrical interconnects, and manufacturing processes. The glass shield's thickness and coverage are optimized for each specific region based on its security requirements.
3Ease of manufacture
If no protection is provided on the IC die backside, then manufacturing simplicity is maintained, but reliability is reduced due to susceptibility to tampering and attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The glass shield is formed on the IC die backside during the manufacturing process itself, before the product is deployed. This preliminary action integrates the security protection feature into the standard manufacturing flow without requiring additional post-manufacturing steps. The glass shield is formed as part of the packaging process, ensuring that security protection is built-in from the outset while maintaining manufacturing simplicity.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
The glass-based shield effectively blocks access to the security asset, while the active shield system detects any tampering attempts by identifying changes in the serial bit stream, thereby enhancing the security of the chip package.
Implementation Method 1
a glass based shield selectively disposed on the IC die at a location above a security asset in the IC die. The glass based shield advantageously prevents access to the security asset via the IC die.
Implementation Method 2
The chip package may optionally include an oxide layer disposed between the glass based shield and the IC die. The oxide layer acts as an insulator against electrical tampering of the IC die.
Implementation Method 3
The detection module is configured to generate and send a serial bit stream to the glass based shield. The detection module is also configured to monitor for changes in the serial bit stream returning from the glass based shield.
Data Source
AI summary
A chip package includes a package substrate and an integrated circuit (IC) die disposed on the package substrate. The IC dies includes a security asset. The chip package also includes a glass based shield selectively disposed on the IC die and above the security asset. The glass based shield is configured to block access to the security asset. In some embodiments, the chip package includes an oxide layer disposed between the glass based shield and the IC die. In some embodiments, the chip package includes a detection module and a wire connecting the detection module to the glass based shield. The detection module is configured to generate and send a serial bit stream to the glass based shield. The detection module is also configured to monitor for changes in the serial bit stream returning from the glass based shield. Changes detected in the serial bit stream indicates the glass based shield has been tampered.