GMI Attack Detection Element for Post-Attack EM Wave Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for detecting electromagnetic wave attacks on electronic chips and system-in-packages (SiPs) are limited to real-time detection, failing to provide reliable post-attack identification.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a method using giant magneto-impedance (GMI) effect-based detection elements, where the remanent magnetization is set to a predefined value below its maximum, allowing impedance measurements before and after a potential attack to detect significant differences, indicating past electromagnetic interference.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If detection coils are used to detect electromagnetic wave attacks in real-time, then detection capability during attacks is improved, but the ability to detect attacks after they have occurred is lost
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by setting the remanent magnetisation of the GMI-effect material to a predefined value below its maximum before the attack occurs. This pre-configured state enables the material to detect and retain evidence of electromagnetic wave attacks even after the attack has ceased, allowing post-attack detection capability that complements real-time detection methods
2Productivity
If oscillation frequency measurement is used to detect attacks, then real-time detection is achieved, but only attacks happening at the moment of measurement can be detected
Solution Approach 1:
The patent employs parameter changes by utilizing the impedance of the GMI-effect material as the detection parameter instead of oscillation frequency. The impedance of GMI material is highly sensitive to magnetic field changes caused by electromagnetic wave attacks, and this impedance change persists after the attack, enabling both rapid detection and post-attack verification through impedance measurement
3Measurement precision
If detection coils are used, then electromagnetic coupling during attacks provides detection signal, but no durable detection signal remains after the attack
Solution Approach 1:
The patent converts the harmful effect of electromagnetic wave-induced magnetic field changes into a beneficial durable detection signal. The GMI-effect material's impedance changes in response to the magnetic field from electromagnetic attacks, and this impedance change persists after the attack, transforming the transient attack signal into a lasting detection indicator that can be measured later
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
Enables reliable, durable detection of electromagnetic wave attacks by detecting impedance variations in GMI materials, even with minimal magnetization changes, providing post-attack verification.
Implementation Method 1
said attack detection element including at least one giant magneto-impedance, GMI, effect electrically-conductive material
Implementation Method 2
The electromagnetic waves are emitted by the coil of the attack probe in the form of shots with a duration equal to a few nanoseconds, which generates disturbing eddy currents in the metallisation lines of the attacked circuit
Data Source
AI summary
A method is provided for detecting an attack by electromagnetic waves on an electronic chip or system-in-package type device including an attack detection element comprising a GMI-effect electrically-conductive material. The method includes demagnetising the GMI-effect material such that the value of its remanent magnetisation is equal to a predefined value lower than the value of its maximum remanent magnetisation. The method further includes determining a first value of the impedance of the attack detection element, and then after a time period during which the device might have undergone an attack, measuring a second value of the impedance of the attack detection element by circulating in the GMI-effect electrically-conductive material an alternating current with the same frequency as when determining the first impedance value. The method also includes comparing the first and second values of the impedance of the attack detection element.