GNSS Angle-of-Arrival Spoofing Rejection for Autonomous Vehicles
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Solution Overview
Problem
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where adversaries transmit fake signals to disrupt positioning accuracy, and existing anti-spoofing systems relying on signal strength comparisons are not always effective, especially in targeted or weak signal scenarios.
Innovation Solution
A system for autonomous vehicles that uses a multi-element antenna and signal processor to identify the angles of arrival for GNSS signals, distinguishing between legitimate and spoofed signals by analyzing phase differences, and suppressing spoofed signals to ensure accurate positioning.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing anti-spoofing systems rely on signal strength comparison, then implementation is simple, but effectiveness is insufficient in targeted or weak signal scenarios
Solution Approach 1:
The patent transitions from one-dimensional signal strength comparison to multi-dimensional signal analysis by incorporating angle of arrival measurements. The system uses multiple antenna elements to determine the spatial direction from which GNSS signals arrive, adding a geometric dimension to the anti-spoofing verification process. This allows the system to detect spoofed signals that have incorrect angular characteristics even when their power levels appear legitimate.
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary verification of signal authenticity by checking whether the angle of arrival of received GNSS signals matches the expected geometric relationship between the receiver and known satellite positions. This pre-processing validation occurs before position calculation, allowing the system to reject spoofed signals early in the signal processing chain and prevent them from corrupting the positioning solution.
2Measurement precision
If GNSS signals are very weak at ground-level, then genuine signals are difficult to detect, but spoofed signals can easily drown them out
Solution Approach 1:
The system uses feedback from the known satellite constellation geometry and expected signal directions to validate received signals. By continuously comparing measured angle of arrival against predicted geometric relationships, the system creates a closed-loop verification mechanism that can identify and reject spoofed signals while maintaining sensitivity to weak genuine signals.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces angle of arrival measurement as an intermediary verification parameter between the raw GNSS signal and the position calculation. This intermediate geometric check acts as a mediator that filters out spoofed signals before they can interfere with the positioning solution, protecting the system without requiring direct modification of the weak genuine signals.
3Productivity
If signal strength comparison is used for anti-spoofing, then processing is fast, but it fails when spoofed signals match expected strength levels
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the signal verification process into multiple independent checks: signal strength validation, angle of arrival measurement, and geometric consistency verification. This segmentation allows the system to perform rapid parallel processing of different signal characteristics, maintaining high processing speed while adding multiple layers of spoofing detection that work together to improve reliability.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
Effectively combats GNSS spoofing by reliably detecting and suppressing fake signals, maintaining positioning accuracy even in weak signal conditions and preventing misdirection or course corrections caused by illicit actors.
Implementation Method 1
distinguishing between legitimate and spoofed signals by analyzing phase differences
Data Source
AI summary
A system includes a vehicle and a vehicle control system configured to autonomously control one or more operations of the vehicle. The system also includes a navigation receiver configured to identify a location of the vehicle and to provide the identified location to the vehicle control system. To identify the location of the vehicle, the navigation receiver is configured to identify whether navigation signals received by the navigation receiver are spoofed based on angles of arrival for the navigation signals and to suppress any of the navigation signals determined to be spoofed. The navigation receiver may be configured to suppress any of the navigation signals determined to be spoofed in order to prevent an illicit actor from misdirecting the vehicle to an undesired location and/or to prevent an illicit actor from causing the vehicle to make course corrections based on an incorrect current location of the vehicle.