GNSS Antenna Motion Control for Spoofing Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current methods for detecting spoofed GNSS signals are vulnerable to advanced spoofing techniques, as they rely on deterministic antenna motions that can be compromised by adversaries using remote sensing or placing spoofers in insensitive locations, leading to undetectable false signals.

Innovation Solution

A cryptographically-secure method involving a cryptographic code generator that controls the motion of a GNSS receiver's antenna, creating random or pseudo-random motions, making it impractical for adversaries to generate spoofing signals that mimic the carrier phase histories, and a receiver unit that determines whether signals originated from a spoofer based on carrier phase variations.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of manufacture

If deterministic antenna motions are used for spoofing detection, then the detection method is simple to implement, but the system becomes vulnerable to advanced spoofing techniques where adversaries can compromise the detection by using remote sensing or placing spoofers in insensitive locations

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesimplicity of detection method implementationVSAvoidsecurity against advanced spoofing techniques
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of manufactureVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent transitions from deterministic to random or pseudo-random antenna motion patterns. The antenna controller dynamically changes the motion pattern based on cryptographic codes, making the system adaptive and unpredictable. This dynamic approach ensures that spoofers must continuously adapt their signals to match the changing antenna positions, rendering deterministic detection methods ineffective and providing security against advanced spoofing techniques.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the parameter of antenna motion from deterministic to random or pseudo-random patterns. By varying the motion parameters according to cryptographic codes, the system creates a security mechanism where the antenna positions cannot be predicted by adversaries. This parameter change makes it computationally infeasible for spoofers to generate accurate fake signals, thereby improving security while maintaining implementation simplicity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Reliability

If random or pseudo-random antenna motions are used controlled by cryptographic codes, then the security against brute-force attacks is improved, but the device complexity increases due to the cryptographic code generator and antenna controller

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against brute-force attacksVSAvoidcomplexity of cryptographic code generator and antenna controller
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The cryptographic code generator and antenna controller serve multiple functions: they control the random or pseudo-random antenna motion patterns, provide security against brute-force attacks, and enable the system to adapt to changing spoofing attempts. By making these components multi-functional, the patent reduces the need for separate dedicated security modules, thereby managing device complexity while maintaining high security standards.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent uses cryptographic codes to generate random or pseudo-random motion patterns that can be replicated and verified. The cryptographic code generator creates codes that can be independently verified by the antenna controller and receiver, ensuring that the same random pattern is reproduced consistently without requiring complex physical random number generation hardware. This copying approach simplifies the overall system architecture while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

3Measurement precision

If the antenna motion is controlled according to cryptographic codes, then the detection accuracy and security are improved, but the processing time and computational resources required increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaccuracy of spoofing detectionVSAvoidprocessing time for cryptographic code generation and antenna motion control
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent generates cryptographic codes and determines antenna motion patterns in advance before actual spoofing detection is needed. By pre-computing the random or pseudo-random motion sequences and storing them, the system can quickly compare expected versus actual signal characteristics during real-time operation. This preliminary action reduces the computational burden during critical detection moments, thereby improving accuracy without significant time penalty.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements periodic updates of cryptographic codes and antenna motion patterns at defined intervals. Instead of continuous complex computation, the system updates the random patterns periodically, allowing the receiver to use stored reference data during intervals between updates. This periodic action significantly reduces real-time processing requirements while maintaining high detection accuracy and security throughout the operational period.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

Data Source

PatentUS10295675B2Cryptographically-secure autonomous detection of spoofed GNSS signals
Publication Date: 2019.05.21 ARBITER SYST
  • US10295675B2 patent drawing
  • US10295675B2 patent drawing
  • US10295675B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Methods and systems for cryptographically-secure autonomous detection of spoofed GNSS signals is provided. A method is provided that includes the steps of: generating a cryptographic code, controlling a motion of at least one antenna of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver system according to the cryptographic code, detecting a plurality of satellite signals during the controlled motion of the at least one antenna, and determining, based on carrier phase variations of the detected plurality of satellite signals, whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter.