GNSS Spoofing Detection via Inertial Mixing

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Solution Overview

Problem

GNSS spoofing poses a significant risk to aircraft safety as it can manipulate navigation information, and existing methods lack effective detection techniques to identify when GNSS signals have been altered.

Innovation Solution

A method and system that acquire navigation parameter measurements from both GNSS receivers and inertial reference systems, calculating differential values based on the rate of change of these measurements over time, and comparing them to a threshold to detect spoofing.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If GNSS technology is used for aircraft navigation, then navigation accuracy is improved, but susceptibility to spoofing attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvenavigation accuracyVSAvoidspoofing vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an intermediary detection system that acts as a mediator between the GNSS receiver and the navigation system. This intermediary monitors GNSS signals for spoofing characteristics and provides authentication verification before the navigation system accepts GNSS data, thereby maintaining navigation accuracy while blocking spoofing attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements feedback mechanisms where the spoofing detection system continuously monitors GNSS signals and provides real-time feedback about signal authenticity. When spoofing is detected, the system feedbacks control signals to reject the spoofed data and switch to alternative navigation sources, maintaining navigation integrity while preserving GNSS accuracy when legitimate.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Reliability

If spoofing detection techniques are implemented, then aircraft safety is improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaircraft safetyVSAvoiddetection system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the spoofing detection function into separate, modular components including signal monitoring modules, authentication verification modules, and anomaly detection modules. This segmentation allows the complex detection task to be divided into manageable independent units that can be implemented and maintained separately, reducing overall system complexity while improving safety.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent performs preliminary authentication and verification actions on GNSS signals before they are fully processed by the navigation system. By pre-screening signals for spoofing characteristics and establishing baseline authenticity checks in advance, the system prevents spoofed data from entering the main navigation processing chain, thereby improving safety without requiring complex real-time analysis of all navigation data.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS11585941B2GNSS satellite spoofing detection using multi-independent inertial mixing
Publication Date: 2023.02.21 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC
  • US11585941B2 patent drawing
  • US11585941B2 patent drawing
  • US11585941B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Techniques for detecting GNSS spoofing using inertial mixing data are disclosed. One or more navigation parameters are determined by at least one GNSS receiver and a plurality of IRS from at least two periods of time. The navigation parameters from the GNSS receiver(s) and the IRS are compared at each time period, and the difference(s) between the compared navigation parameters are further compared to generate at least one differential value. A system can detect GNSS spoofing by comparing the at least one differential value to a suitable threshold. In one aspect each IRS navigation parameter is compared with a corresponding GNSS navigation parameter, wherein the plurality of differential values is mixed before threshold comparison. In another aspect, each IRS navigation parameter is mixed before comparison with a GNSS navigation parameter, and the resulting differential value is then compared against a threshold.