GNSS Jitter Tracking Anti-Spoofing Algorithm
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Solution Overview
Problem
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, which can deceive receivers into calculating false positions, leading to navigation system degradation, as existing protection methods often stop processing GNSS signals and rely on inertial sensors, thereby degrading navigation capabilities.
Innovation Solution
A method that combines measuring GNSS carrier signal characteristics with vehicle position jitter using a low-cost inertial measurement unit (IMU) to distinguish true from falsified signals, allowing continued navigation even under intelligent, directed spoofing attacks, by introducing natural or artificial jitter to correlate signal behavior with a tightly coupled inertial navigation system.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If RAIM detects spoofing, then spoofing detection capability is improved, but navigation capability degrades because the system stops processing GNSS signals and relies on inertial sensors
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a feedback mechanism where the INS continuously provides position information back to the GNSS signal processing system. This feedback loop allows the system to compare expected signal characteristics with actual received signals, enabling continued detection and filtering of spoofed signals while maintaining navigation capability through integrated GNSS-INS operation rather than complete GNSS signal rejection
Solution Approach 2:
The patent merges GNSS signal processing with INS operation into a tightly coupled system. By combining the strengths of both systems—GNSS providing absolute position references and INS providing continuous navigation data—the system maintains navigation capability even when spoofing is detected, rather than switching to INS-only mode which degrades performance
2Adaptability or versatility
If GNSS signals are used for navigation, then global coverage and low-cost solution are improved, but vulnerability to spoofing attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by using the INS to predict expected GNSS signal characteristics before processing actual GNSS signals. By pre-calculating what true signals should look like based on INS position data, the system can proactively identify and reject spoofed signals that deviate from predictions, rather than reacting after spoofing has already affected navigation
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces the INS as an intermediary between the external GNSS signal environment and the navigation solution. The INS acts as a mediator that filters and validates GNSS signals, using its independent position measurements to verify the authenticity of received GNSS signals before they are used in the final navigation calculation, thereby protecting against spoofing while maintaining GNSS signal utilization
3Reliability
If spoofing protection is implemented by stopping GNSS signal processing, then reliability against spoofing is improved, but navigation accuracy and continuity deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The system uses feedback from the INS to continuously monitor and validate GNSS signal authenticity. By comparing INS-derived position changes with GNSS-measured positions, the system can detect spoofing attempts and filter out corrupted signals while maintaining continuous navigation processing, thereby preserving both protection and accuracy without stopping signal processing
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts only the authentic components of GNSS signals for navigation processing while separating and rejecting spoofed components. By using INS data to identify which GNSS signals are genuine, the system extracts useful navigation information from true signals while discarding spoofed signals, maintaining navigation accuracy without complete signal processing shutdown
Data Source
AI summary
A system and method to distinguish spoofing signals from true GNSS signals is disclosed. One aspect of the present invention combines measuring GNSS carrier signals with measuring jitter in a vehicle's position via a low-cost inertial measurement unit (IMU) to distinguish spoofing signals from true GNSS signals. The present invention employs natural and/or artificial jitter of a vehicle, that, when combined with a tightly coupled inertial navigation system (INS), allows the receiver to distinguish the spoofing GNSS signal from the true GNSS signal. This spoofer survivability algorithm may be implemented, for example, in the software of a GNSS (or GPS) navigation system.