GNSS Receiver Signal Integrity Detection via Event History Comparison

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Solution Overview

Problem

GNSS receivers in electric power delivery systems are vulnerable to attacks such as signal manipulation, jamming, and spoofing, which can lead to incorrect time and location calculations, compromising the integrity of the system and potentially causing improper control of the power delivery.

Innovation Solution

A GNSS receiver maintains a history of satellite view events and compares present events against this history to detect any deviations, using signal strength patterns and expected event times to determine signal integrity, and sets a flag if the integrity is compromised, thereby preventing the use of manipulated signals in time calculations.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If GNSS receiver uses satellite signals for time calculations, then time synchronization accuracy is improved, but vulnerability to signal manipulation attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetime synchronization accuracyVSAvoidsignal integrity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary actions by maintaining a history of satellite view events and calculating expected event times before actual signal reception. This allows the receiver to pre-establish a baseline for normal satellite visibility patterns, enabling it to detect and reject manipulated signals that deviate from expected behavior

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback by continuously comparing actual satellite signal events against the historical baseline of expected events. When deviations are detected (indicating potential manipulation), the system provides feedback by setting integrity flags and discarding compromised signals, thereby maintaining time synchronization accuracy while rejecting malicious inputs

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Difficulty of detecting and measuring

If GNSS receiver maintains history of satellite views for detection, then detection capability is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesignal manipulation detection capabilityVSAvoiddata storage and processing requirements
Core Design Contradiction:
Difficulty of detecting and measuringVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system segments the detection process into distinct components: maintaining a history of satellite view events, calculating expected event times based on this history, comparing actual events against expectations, and setting integrity flags when deviations are detected. This segmentation allows each function to be implemented independently and efficiently

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes parameters by transforming raw satellite signal data into structured event records with specific characteristics (timing, satellite identification, signal strength patterns). By analyzing changes in these parameters over time and comparing against historical baselines, the system can detect manipulation without requiring complex artificial intelligence algorithms

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS9599719B2Detection of manipulated satellite time signals
Publication Date: 2017.03.21 SCHWEITZER ENGINEERING LABORATORIES INC
  • US9599719B2 patent drawing
  • US9599719B2 patent drawing
  • US9599719B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Disclosed herein is a system for detecting manipulation of a GNSS signal and mitigating against such manipulation. A GNSS receiver receives GNSS signals from a plurality of GNSS satellites, and calculates event times for each GNSS satellite. The GNSS receiver then compares a next event time for a particular GNSS satellite with an expected next event time for the particular GNSS satellite. If the difference between the expected next event time and the next event times exceeds a predetermined threshold, then the GNSS receiver indicates that signal integrity may be compromised.