GNSS Securing Interface for Spoofing Immunity
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Solution Overview
Problem
GPS signals are vulnerable to jamming and spoofing, which can disrupt critical applications relying on precise timing, such as financial transactions, power grid operations, and communication networks, and existing countermeasures often require modifications to the GNSS receiver or are not transparent to the receiver.
Innovation Solution
A securing interface apparatus is inserted between the GNSS antenna and the receiver, comprising a second immune GNSS receiver with a detection module and a GNSS Simulator that analyzes signal integrity, generates redundant simulated signals when authenticity is compromised, and maintains timing continuity using a local accurate clock.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If a GPS receiver is used for timing applications, then accurate timing information is provided, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing and jamming attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a securing interface apparatus as an intermediary component between the antenna and the GPS receiver. This apparatus includes a signal processor that analyzes incoming GPS signals for authenticity indicators and a simulator that generates synthetic GPS signals when spoofing is detected. The securing interface acts as a mediator that protects the receiver from malicious signals while maintaining the receiver's original functionality unchanged.
Solution Approach 2:
The system is divided into separate functional components: the original GPS receiver, the securing interface apparatus with signal processing capabilities, and the GPS simulator. This segmentation allows the securing interface to independently analyze signals and intervene when necessary, without requiring modifications to the receiver's internal structure.
2Reliability
If existing countermeasures are implemented to protect against spoofing, then security is improved, but the GPS receiver requires modifications
Solution Approach 1:
The securing interface apparatus serves as an external intermediary that protects the GPS receiver without requiring any internal modifications. It sits between the antenna and receiver, analyzing signals and generating protective synthetic signals while leaving the receiver's original design intact.
Solution Approach 2:
The system creates a copy of legitimate GPS signals through the simulator component. When spoofing is detected, the simulator generates synthetic GPS signals that mimic authentic satellite signals, providing a backup timing source without modifying the original receiver.
3Measurement precision
If signal analysis is performed to detect spoofing, then detection accuracy is improved, but processing time and complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
The signal processing and analysis functions are extracted from the GPS receiver and placed in the separate securing interface apparatus. This extraction allows the receiver to remain simple while the interface handles the complex task of analyzing signal authenticity indicators such as code phase, carrier phase, and signal power characteristics.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces physical modifications to the receiver with electronic/software-based signal processing in the securing interface. The interface uses digital signal processing techniques to analyze authenticity indicators and automatically switch to synthetic signals when spoofing is detected, eliminating the need for mechanical or hardware changes to the receiver.
Data Source
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AI summary
A securing interface apparatus to be inserted between a GNSS antenna and. a first, unsecured, GNSS receiver fed by the antenna, for providing immunity against spoofing or jamming or interrupting of the timing provided by the first unsecured GNSS receiver. The seeming interface apparatus comprises (a) a second GNSS receiver, fed by the antenna and including a locai oscillator and being immune against spoofing or jamming of timing, for outputting trusted timing and the last GNSS data, the second GNSS receiver including a detection module which is adapted to analyze raw RF signals received from GNSS satellites and verify the signals integrity and authenticity (b) a GNSS Simulator, fed by the trusted timing and GNSS data, the GNSS Simulator is adapted to: as long as the received GNSS data is found authentic, allowing the received GNSS data to reach the input of the first, unsecured, GNSS receiver; upon detecting that the received GNSS data is not authentic, produce, using the output of the local oscillator and at least a portion of the last GNSS data, redundant simulated RF GNSS signals mimicking raw RF signals received from GNSS satellites; and transmit the redundant simulated RF GNSS to the input of the first unsecured GNSS receiver.