GNSS Spoofing Detection via Carrier Phase and Antenna Motion
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Current anti-spoofing technologies for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are inadequate in detecting sophisticated spoofing attacks, particularly those that do not require explicit or implicit knowledge of exact position or attitude, and lack clear hypothesis test statistics, threshold values, and probabilities of false alarm and missed detection.
Innovation Solution
A method and system that move a receiving location in a predetermined articulation pattern while receiving GNSS signals, high-pass filtering carrier phase measurements, and determining likelihood cost functions for both non-spoofed and spoofed configurations to calculate a spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic, which is compared to a predetermined threshold to detect spoofing attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing anti-spoofing technologies (RAIM, cross-correlation, NMA, multiple-antenna techniques) are used, then spoofing detection capability is improved, but device complexity and hardware requirements increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the essential carrier phase measurement data from the GNSS signal processing chain, separating the spoofing detection function from the main navigation solution. By focusing exclusively on carrier phase residuals and their relationship to antenna motion, the system achieves spoofing detection without requiring complex multiple-antenna arrays, external secure receivers, or modifications to GNSS message structures.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses the receiver's own antenna motion characteristics and internally generated carrier phase measurements to detect spoofing attacks. The known antenna motion pattern serves as a reference that the system compares against actual carrier phase behavior, enabling self-contained spoofing detection without external aiding or additional hardware components.
2Reliability
If advanced RAIM algorithms are implemented, then spoofing detection is improved, but detection speed is limited and may only detect attacks at onset
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements continuous monitoring of carrier phase measurements against the known antenna motion pattern throughout the spoofing attack duration. By continuously comparing expected carrier phase behavior (based on antenna motion) with actual measurements, the system can detect spoofing at any point during the attack, not just at onset, eliminating detection delays.
3Speed
If cross-correlation techniques with secure receivers are used, then detection speed is improved, but loss of information increases due to reliance on high bandwidth communications links
Solution Approach 1:
The system generates all necessary reference data internally using the known antenna motion pattern and processes carrier phase measurements locally. This self-contained approach eliminates dependence on external secure receivers and high-bandwidth communications links, preventing information loss while maintaining fast detection capability through direct comparison of carrier phase residuals with expected values.
4Reliability
If multiple-antenna techniques are implemented, then spoofing mitigation is improved, but device complexity and cost increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the essential spoofing detection function from complex multiple-antenna systems by utilizing carrier phase measurements from a single antenna in combination with known antenna motion patterns. This extraction approach achieves spoofing detection capability without requiring multiple antennas, signal combining hardware, or complex spatial processing algorithms.
Data Source
AI summary
Methods and systems that can detect GNSS spoofing attacks and that do not require explicit or implicit knowledge of exact position or attitude and that provide hypothesis test statistics, threshold values, and probabilities of false alarm and missed detection.