Spoofing Detection for Civilian GNSS Signals Using Encrypted Bursts

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Solution Overview

Problem

Unencrypted civilian GNSS signals are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, which cannot be effectively detected using existing receiver autonomous integrity monitoring techniques, as spoofer can mimic true signals, leading to incorrect location and time determinations.

Innovation Solution

A system and method that processes intermittent bursts of encrypted GNSS signals to determine if unencrypted signals are being spoofed by utilizing a high-gain ground-based antenna to determine truth values of encrypted signal features, which are then combined with user receiver estimates to compute a detection statistic compared to a threshold, allowing for sophisticated spoofing detection without altering the signal structure of unencrypted signals.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If unencrypted civilian GNSS signals are used, then ease of operation and accessibility are improved, but vulnerability to spoofing attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesignal accessibilityVSAvoidspoofing vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces encrypted signals as an intermediary element to detect spoofing attacks on unencrypted signals. The encrypted signals serve as a reference or mediator that allows the receiver to verify the authenticity of unencrypted signals without requiring changes to the unencrypted signal structure itself.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent segments the detection process into separate processing of encrypted and unencrypted signals. By processing short segments of encrypted signals and comparing them with corresponding unencrypted signal segments, the system can detect spoofing without requiring continuous access to encrypted signals.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Measurement precision

If encrypted signals are processed continuously, then spoofing detection accuracy is improved, but use of energy and processing load increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection accuracyVSAvoidprocessing energy consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements periodic processing of encrypted signal segments rather than continuous processing. The receiver processes short segments of encrypted signals at intervals, which reduces energy consumption and processing load while maintaining adequate spoofing detection accuracy through selective sampling.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

3Reliability

If real-time access to encrypted signal information is required, then spoofing detection reliability is improved, but device complexity and infrastructure requirements increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection reliabilityVSAvoidinfrastructure complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent prepares encrypted signal segments and their corresponding unencrypted signal segments in advance for comparison. By pre-processing and storing these signal segments, the system reduces the need for complex real-time infrastructure while maintaining detection reliability through prepared reference data.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS8712051B2Spoofing detection for civilian GNSS signals
Publication Date: 2014.04.29 CORNELL UNIVERSITY
  • US8712051B2 patent drawing
  • US8712051B2 patent drawing
  • US8712051B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system and method for detecting spoofing of signals by processing intermittent bursts of encrypted Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals in order to determine whether unencrypted signals are being spoofed. The system and method can allow a specially equipped GNSS receiver to detect sophisticated spoofing that cannot he detected using receiver antonomous integrity monitoring techniques. The system and method do not require changes to the signal structure of encrypted civilian GNSS signals, but instead use a short segment of an encrypted signal that is broadcast by the same GNSS spacecraft which broadcast the unencrypted signal of interest.