GNSS Spoofing Detection via Signal Segmentation and Holdover Switching

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Systems relying on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for positioning, navigation, and timing are vulnerable to anomalies such as spoofing and jamming attacks, which can disrupt critical infrastructure by providing misleading timing and positioning information, with current detection methods being reactionary and unable to prevent initial compromise.

Innovation Solution

A fast anomaly detection and mitigation system that splits GNSS signals into sub-data signals for real-time monitoring and power level analysis, enabling early detection of spoofing or jamming attempts and switching to a local holdover oscillator to maintain timing accuracy before the attack can corrupt the system, while alerting network operators.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If GPS receiver trusts all GPS signals to be true, then the system can operate with simple receiver design, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing attacks and cannot detect counterfeit signals

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesystem security against spoofingVSAvoidreceiver design complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the GPS signal processing into multiple independent components: a GPS receiver for signal acquisition, a separate anomaly detection unit for monitoring signal characteristics, and a switching module for signal selection. This segmentation allows the receiver to maintain simplicity while adding security through independent verification modules that analyze signal anomalies without requiring complex changes to the core GPS reception functionality.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary anomaly detection unit that acts as a mediator between the GPS receiver and the timing system. This intermediary monitors GPS signals for anomalies (such as unexpected power levels or signal characteristics) and can prevent compromised signals from reaching the timing system, thereby enhancing security without requiring the GPS receiver itself to become more complex.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Speed

If the system uses real-time signal splitting and monitoring to detect spoofing attacks, then detection speed improves, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveanomaly detection speedVSAvoidsignal processing complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
SpeedVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary action by continuously monitoring GPS signal characteristics (such as power levels and signal properties) before the spoofing attack can fully compromise the system. The anomaly detection unit is positioned to analyze signals in real-time and detect anomalies during the capture period, enabling early intervention before the timing system is corrupted.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The signal processing is segmented into distinct functional blocks: signal splitting, power level monitoring, anomaly detection, and switching control. Each segment performs a specific function, which simplifies the overall complexity by making each component's task more manageable and specialized rather than requiring a single complex processing unit.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

3Reliability

If the system switches to local holdover oscillator upon detecting anomalies, then timing accuracy is maintained, but the system loses GPS timing synchronization

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetiming accuracy during attackVSAvoidGPS timing synchronization
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The patent prepares for potential signal compromise by having a local holdover oscillator ready as a backup timing source. When GPS signals are compromised, the system can switch to this pre-prepared backup source, which was previously synchronized to GPS time. This cushioning mechanism ensures continuous accurate timing without requiring the system to wait for or recover from a complete synchronization loss.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #11Beforehand cushioning (Prior cushioning)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements feedback through continuous monitoring of GPS signal characteristics and automatic switching based on detected anomalies. The anomaly detection unit provides feedback about signal quality, and the switching module responds by selecting the appropriate signal source (GPS or holdover oscillator). This feedback loop ensures timing accuracy is maintained by dynamically adapting to signal conditions without manual intervention.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS10509130B2Positioning, navigation, and timing device interference and spoofing detector with timing mitigation
Publication Date: 2019.12.17 THE MITRE CORPORATION
  • US10509130B2 patent drawing
  • US10509130B2 patent drawing
  • US10509130B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Disclosed herein are system, method, and computer program product embodiments for a GNSS interference and spoofing fast detection and mitigation system. A RF signal associated with a PNT device, such as a GNSS receiver, is received. The received RF signal is split into a plurality of sub-data signals. The received RF signal is re-routed by sending each of the plurality of sub-data signals to at least one of a processing module and a switching module. An anomaly associated with a second sub-data signal is detected. The anomaly is detected during a capture period of an adversarial attack on the PNT device, prior to corruption of any associated system depending on outputs from the PNT device. An output of a first sub-data signal of the plurality of sub-data signals is terminated based on the anomaly detected with the second sub-data signal.