GNSS Spoofing Detection via Sparse Waveform Decomposition

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing GNSS receivers lack effective methods to detect spoofing attacks, which can deceive receivers into locking onto counterfeit signals, leading to flawed position, velocity, and timing solutions.

Innovation Solution

The system employs a processor and a dictionary of pre-computed discrete-time waveforms to identify a sparse combination of components in the output signal of a correlator bank, using sparse optimization algorithms like LASSO to distinguish between intended and spoofing signals.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of manufacture

If commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) receivers are used, then cost is reduced and broad applications are enabled, but ability to detect spoofing attacks is lost

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvereceiver costVSAvoidspoofing detection capability
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of manufactureVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system pre-computes and stores discrete-time waveform functions representing expected authentic GNSS signals in a lookup table before signal reception. During operation, the receiver compares incoming signals against these pre-computed waveforms to quickly identify spoofing attacks, eliminating the need for complex real-time signal generation and enabling detection in cost-effective COTS receivers.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If spoofing detection algorithms are implemented to identify counterfeit signals, then spoofing detection capability is improved, but computational complexity and processing time increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection capabilityVSAvoidsignal processing complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system pre-computes and stores discrete-time waveform functions representing expected authentic GNSS signals in a lookup table before signal reception. During operation, the receiver compares incoming signals against these pre-computed waveforms to quickly identify spoofing attacks, eliminating the need for complex real-time signal generation and enabling detection in cost-effective COTS receivers.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system creates simplified representations (copies) of authentic GNSS signals in the form of discrete-time waveform functions stored in a lookup table. These waveform copies capture the essential characteristics of authentic signals without requiring full signal reconstruction, enabling efficient comparison and detection while reducing computational complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

3Measurement precision

If correlation analysis is performed on received signals to identify signal components, then measurement precision is improved, but processing time increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesignal component identification accuracyVSAvoidprocessing time
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The system pre-computes and stores discrete-time waveform functions representing expected authentic GNSS signals in a lookup table before signal reception. During operation, the receiver compares incoming signals against these pre-computed waveforms to quickly identify spoofing attacks, eliminating the need for complex real-time signal generation and enabling detection in cost-effective COTS receivers.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS12292516B2System and method for global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing detection
Publication Date: 2025.05.06 BOARD OF RGT THE UNIV OF TEXAS SYST
  • US12292516B2 patent drawing
  • US12292516B2 patent drawing
  • US12292516B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing detection and classification technique is provided. An optimization problem is formulated at the baseband correlator domain by using an optimization algorithm such as the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) algorithm, for example. A model of correlator tap outputs of the intended received signal is created to form a dictionary of pre-computed waveform functions (e.g., triangle-like-shaped functions). Sparse signal processing can be leveraged to choose a decomposition of pre-computed waveform functions from the dictionary. The optimal solution of this minimization problem can discriminate the presence of a potential spoofing attack peak by observing the decomposition of two different code-phase values (authentic and spoofed) in a sparse vector output. A threshold can be used to mitigate false alarms. Furthermore, a variation of the minimization problem can be provided that enhances the dictionary to a higher resolution.