GNSS Spoofing Detection via Motion Sensor Comparison

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Solution Overview

Problem

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, which can lead to inaccurate positioning and potential accidents, as existing technologies fail to effectively detect and mitigate false GNSS signals.

Innovation Solution

The proposed solution involves receiving GNSS signals through a GNSS antenna and comparing the movement data derived from these signals with data from motion sensors like accelerometers and gyroscopes, determining if the difference exceeds threshold values to indicate potential spoofing.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If GNSS signals are used to determine position and movement, then navigation capability is provided, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing attacks causing inaccurate positioning

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvenavigation capabilityVSAvoidpositioning accuracy
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces motion sensors (accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers) as intermediary devices that independently measure device movement. These sensor measurements serve as a mediator to verify GNSS-derived movement data, detecting discrepancies that indicate spoofing attacks without replacing the GNSS navigation function.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The system continuously compares movement data from motion sensors with movement data derived from GNSS signals, creating a feedback loop. When discrepancies exceed a threshold, the system generates a spoofing indication, providing real-time verification and enabling corrective actions to maintain navigation reliability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Measurement precision

If motion sensors are added to detect spoofing, then detection capability is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection capabilityVSAvoidsensor system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent leverages motion sensors that are already present in modern mobile devices for other functions (screen orientation, step counting, gaming). By repurposing these existing sensors for spoofing detection, the system improves measurement precision without significantly increasing device complexity, as the sensors serve multiple functions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Solution Approach 2:

The system uses the device's own existing motion sensors to detect spoofing attacks, eliminating the need for dedicated external detection hardware. The sensors already embedded in the device for other purposes are utilized to provide spoofing detection capability, reducing overall system complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS11719828B2Techniques for detection of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) error using motion sensor output
Publication Date: 2023.08.08 QUALCOMM INC
  • US11719828B2 patent drawing
  • US11719828B2 patent drawing
  • US11719828B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Techniques disclosed herein are directed to detect the presence of false, incorrect, or spoofed Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals. Embodiments may comprise receiving, at a mobile device, a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signal via a GNSS antenna of the mobile device; determining first movement data based on the GNSS signal; determining second movement data based on data from one or more motion sensors of the mobile device, wherein the first movement data and the second movement data each comprise respective movement-related information regarding the mobile device during a time period; and providing an indication that GNSS error is occurring based on a determination that a difference between first movement data and the second movement data exceeds a threshold.