GNSS Spoofing Region Detection for Adaptive Positioning

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing satellite navigation systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where malicious actors send false signals that can cause vehicles to stray off course or be rerouted to unintended locations, posing safety risks.

Innovation Solution

Systems and methods to detect spoofed satellite navigation signals by identifying discrepancies in GNSS information, determining spoofing regions, and adjusting positioning units to disregard or switch to alternate positioning techniques when nearing these regions.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If the positioning unit uses GNSS signals for determining position, then positioning accuracy is improved, but vulnerability to spoofing attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepositioning accuracyVSAvoidvulnerability to spoofing attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary detection of spoofing conditions by monitoring GNSS signal characteristics and comparing them against expected parameters before the spoofing can fully compromise positioning. The spoofing detection module proactively identifies discrepancies in signal properties such as code phase, carrier frequency, and signal strength patterns, and takes preventive action by alerting the positioning unit to disregard suspicious signals, thereby neutralizing the spoofing threat before it can significantly degrade positioning accuracy

Inventive Principle:
Principle #9Preliminary anti-action

Solution Approach 2:

A spoofing detection module is introduced as an intermediary between the GNSS receiver and the positioning unit. This intermediate component analyzes GNSS signals for spoofing indicators, validates signal authenticity, and acts as a gatekeeper that determines whether signals should be trusted for positioning calculations. The intermediary layer provides an additional security checkpoint that allows legitimate GNSS signals to pass through while blocking or flagging spoofed signals for further analysis or rejection

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If the system implements spoofing detection and mitigation, then resistance to spoofing attacks is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveresistance to spoofing attacksVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The spoofing detection module leverages existing GNSS signal processing infrastructure and components, using the same antenna, receiver, and signal processing algorithms already present in the device for primary positioning functions. By making the detection module multi-functional—capable of both normal positioning operations and spoofing detection using the same hardware resources—the system achieves enhanced security without proportionally increasing device complexity. The existing GNSS chipset is utilized for dual purposes: legitimate navigation and security monitoring

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Solution Approach 2:

The system uses its own GNSS signal processing capabilities to detect spoofing, rather than requiring entirely separate external hardware. The positioning unit and spoofing detection module share the same GNSS receiver and can cross-validate their findings, with the detection module utilizing the inherent signal characteristics that the positioning algorithms already analyze. This self-service approach allows the system to monitor itself for spoofing conditions using resources already allocated for primary positioning functionality

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Measurement precision

If the positioning unit disregards GNSS signals in spoofing regions, then positioning accuracy is maintained, but loss of information increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepositioning accuracyVSAvoidloss of GNSS positioning data
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The positioning unit dynamically adjusts its signal selection based on real-time spoofing detection status. When spoofing is detected in specific geographic regions or from specific satellite signals, the system adaptively switches to alternative positioning methods or uses only authenticated signals. When no spoofing is detected, the system seamlessly returns to using full GNSS signal sets. This dynamic behavior allows the system to maintain high positioning accuracy by selectively utilizing GNSS data only when it is verified as authentic, while automatically transitioning to backup methods when necessary

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Data Source

PatentUS20250334701A1Systems and methods for detecting and mitigating spoofed satellite navigation signals
Publication Date: 2025.10.30 QUALCOMM INC
  • US20250334701A1 patent drawing
  • US20250334701A1 patent drawing
  • US20250334701A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Determining a boundary of a spoofing region identifying spoofed satellite signals may comprise determining, based on a first set of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals received at a GNSS receiver over a first period of time, at least one GNSS signal corresponding to a GNSS satellite has experienced a first transition, wherein the first transition comprises a transition from a not spoofed state in which the at least one GNSS signal is not determined to be spoofed to a spoofed state in which the at least one GNSS signal is determined to be spoofed, or a transition from the spoofed state to the not spoofed state. Additionally, a first location corresponding to a location at which the GNSS receiver was located during the first transition may be determined.