GNSS Receiver Spoofing Detection via Orbital State Validation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing GNSS systems are susceptible to spoofing, which can lead to erroneous position and time computation, causing adverse effects in navigation and communication systems, and current spoofing detection techniques are complex and unreliable.

Innovation Solution

GNSS receivers validate satellite orbital state vectors and time using authenticated past Orbital Element at Epoch (OEE) data and first principles-based modeling, comparing predicted and received data to detect spoofing by identifying differences beyond predefined thresholds.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If complex spoofing detection techniques are used, then detection reliability may improve, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection reliabilityVSAvoiddetection system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The GNSS receiver performs self-validation by comparing received satellite state vectors against independently calculated state vectors derived from authenticated past OEE data. The system uses its own computational resources and stored reference data to detect spoofing without requiring external validation systems or additional hardware, thereby achieving reliable spoofing detection while maintaining system simplicity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary validation mechanism using authenticated past Orbital Element at Epoch (OEE) data as a reference. This intermediary reference data serves as a mediator between the received GNSS signals and the receiver's internal processing, enabling reliable spoofing detection by comparing against this intermediate reference without requiring complex external verification systems

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Measurement precision

If multiple external hardware systems are integrated for spoofing detection, then detection accuracy improves, but system complexity and cost increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection accuracyVSAvoidhardware integration complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The GNSS receiver achieves spoofing detection capability using only its own processors and memory unit containing authenticated OEE data. The system independently calculates expected state vectors and compares them with received signals without integrating external hardware systems such as inertial navigation systems, multiple GNSS receivers, or visual navigation systems, thereby maintaining detection accuracy while avoiding additional hardware complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The patent creates a computational copy of the satellite's expected state by calculating state vectors from authenticated past OEE data using first principles-based modeling. This computational model serves as a virtual reference that can be compared against received signals, achieving accurate spoofing detection without requiring physical copies or external hardware systems

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Data Source

PatentEP4700439A1System and method to detect spoofing of GNSS signals by validating satellite orbital state vectors and time
Publication Date: 2026.02.25 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC
  • EP4700439A1 patent drawingFigure 1
  • EP4700439A1 patent drawingFigure 2
  • EP4700439A1 patent drawingFigure 3

AI summary

A GNSS receiver comprises a processor and a memory unit communicatively coupled to the processor, the memory unit comprising a database including authenticated past Orbital Element at Epoch (OEE) data for satellites in a GNSS constellation supported by the GNSS receiver. The processor is configured to receive GNSS signals from a first satellite that include first state vectors and a first time; determine calculated state vectors for the first satellite at the first time based on the authenticated past OEE data from the database using a first principles-based modeling technique; and determine whether a difference between the first state vectors from the GNSS signals and the calculated satellite state vectors exceeds a first threshold. In response to determining that the difference between the first state vectors from the GNSS signals and the calculated satellite state vectors exceeds the first threshold, an indication is outputted that the GNSS signals are spoofed.