GPS Spoofing Detection via INS-SPRT Comparison

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current methods for detecting and mitigating GPS spoofing attacks are ineffective in dynamic environments and require significant resources, as they rely on GPS signal characteristics and are optimized for static receivers, failing to detect sophisticated spoofing devices and being costly in terms of size, weight, and power (SwAP) needs.

Innovation Solution

A collaborative system using inertial navigation systems (INS) and GPS receivers for binary hypothesis testing, such as sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), to detect spoofed signals by comparing GPS and INS readings, providing a robust and efficient method for both static and dynamic settings with reduced detection delay and network overhead.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If GPS signal characteristics are used for spoofing detection, then detection capability is improved, but the system fails to detect sophisticated spoofing devices that mimic GPS signal characteristics

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection capabilityVSAvoiddetection reliability
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an inertial navigation system (INS) as an intermediary reference system to detect GPS spoofing. Instead of relying solely on GPS signal characteristics that can be mimicked by spoofers, the system uses INS measurements (accelerometer and gyroscope data) as a trusted reference to identify discrepancies between GPS-reported position and physically-measured motion, thereby detecting sophisticated spoofing attempts that replicate GPS signal characteristics.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent replaces reliance on electromagnetic GPS signal analysis with mechanical inertial sensing. By substituting the mechanical INS system (accelerometers and gyroscopes) for GPS signal characteristic analysis, the system achieves more reliable spoofing detection because mechanical motion measurements cannot be faked by software-based GPS spoofers, even those that perfectly mimic signal characteristics.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

2Measurement precision

If multi-antenna array GPS defense is used, then spoofing detection accuracy is improved, but size, weight and power (SwAP) needs increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection accuracyVSAvoidSwAP requirements
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSWeight of moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The patent makes the inertial navigation system serve multiple functions: it provides navigation capability independent of GPS and simultaneously serves as the reference system for spoofing detection. This multi-functionality eliminates the need for separate dedicated anti-spoofing hardware, thereby achieving high detection accuracy without increasing SwAP requirements.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the detection parameter from GPS signal spatial characteristics (which would require multiple antennas) to temporal motion characteristics measured by inertial sensors. By detecting inconsistencies in the time-domain behavior of GPS position reports versus INS-measured motion, the system achieves spoofing detection without requiring the spatial diversity of multiple antennas.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Measurement precision

If GPS signal strength measurement is used for anti-spoofing, then detection capability is improved, but sophisticated spoofing devices can mimic signal characteristics

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveanti-spoofing capabilityVSAvoidresistance to sophisticated spoofing
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an independent inertial reference system as a mediator to verify GPS position reports. Instead of analyzing GPS signal characteristics that sophisticated spoofers can replicate, the system uses the INS as an impartial third-party reference that measures actual physical motion, making it impossible for spoofers to convincingly fake the data without also faking the physical motion sensors.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

4Reliability

If detection techniques optimized for static receivers are used, then static receiver protection is improved, but effectiveness against mobile GPS receivers is reduced

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvestatic receiver protectionVSAvoideffectiveness in dynamic environments
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent transitions from static detection methods to dynamic detection by continuously monitoring the temporal relationship between GPS position reports and INS-measured motion. The system adapts to changing environmental conditions by using the INS as a dynamic reference that updates with each measurement cycle, enabling effective spoofing detection whether the receiver is stationary or moving through complex trajectories.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Data Source

PatentUS8922427B2Methods and systems for detecting GPS spoofing attacks
Publication Date: 2014.12.30 BAE SYSTEMS INFORMATION ANDELECTRONIC SYSTEMS INTEGRATION INC
  • US8922427B2 patent drawing
  • US8922427B2 patent drawing
  • US8922427B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system and method for detecting global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks includes collecting GPS readings along with inertial navigational system (INS) readings as a ground truth, and sequentially testing the GPS readings and INS readings through the use of a sequential probability ratio testing (SPRT) process.