GPS Spoofing Detection via INS-SPRT Comparison
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current methods for detecting and mitigating GPS spoofing attacks are ineffective in dynamic environments and require significant resources, as they rely on GPS signal characteristics and are optimized for static receivers, failing to detect sophisticated spoofing devices and being costly in terms of size, weight, and power (SwAP) needs.
Innovation Solution
A collaborative system using inertial navigation systems (INS) and GPS receivers for binary hypothesis testing, such as sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), to detect spoofed signals by comparing GPS and INS readings, providing a robust and efficient method for both static and dynamic settings with reduced detection delay and network overhead.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If GPS signal characteristics are used for spoofing detection, then detection capability is improved, but the system fails to detect sophisticated spoofing devices that mimic GPS signal characteristics
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an inertial navigation system (INS) as an intermediary reference system to detect GPS spoofing. Instead of relying solely on GPS signal characteristics that can be mimicked by spoofers, the system uses INS measurements (accelerometer and gyroscope data) as a trusted reference to identify discrepancies between GPS-reported position and physically-measured motion, thereby detecting sophisticated spoofing attempts that replicate GPS signal characteristics.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces reliance on electromagnetic GPS signal analysis with mechanical inertial sensing. By substituting the mechanical INS system (accelerometers and gyroscopes) for GPS signal characteristic analysis, the system achieves more reliable spoofing detection because mechanical motion measurements cannot be faked by software-based GPS spoofers, even those that perfectly mimic signal characteristics.
2Measurement precision
If multi-antenna array GPS defense is used, then spoofing detection accuracy is improved, but size, weight and power (SwAP) needs increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent makes the inertial navigation system serve multiple functions: it provides navigation capability independent of GPS and simultaneously serves as the reference system for spoofing detection. This multi-functionality eliminates the need for separate dedicated anti-spoofing hardware, thereby achieving high detection accuracy without increasing SwAP requirements.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the detection parameter from GPS signal spatial characteristics (which would require multiple antennas) to temporal motion characteristics measured by inertial sensors. By detecting inconsistencies in the time-domain behavior of GPS position reports versus INS-measured motion, the system achieves spoofing detection without requiring the spatial diversity of multiple antennas.
3Measurement precision
If GPS signal strength measurement is used for anti-spoofing, then detection capability is improved, but sophisticated spoofing devices can mimic signal characteristics
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an independent inertial reference system as a mediator to verify GPS position reports. Instead of analyzing GPS signal characteristics that sophisticated spoofers can replicate, the system uses the INS as an impartial third-party reference that measures actual physical motion, making it impossible for spoofers to convincingly fake the data without also faking the physical motion sensors.
4Reliability
If detection techniques optimized for static receivers are used, then static receiver protection is improved, but effectiveness against mobile GPS receivers is reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent transitions from static detection methods to dynamic detection by continuously monitoring the temporal relationship between GPS position reports and INS-measured motion. The system adapts to changing environmental conditions by using the INS as a dynamic reference that updates with each measurement cycle, enabling effective spoofing detection whether the receiver is stationary or moving through complex trajectories.
Data Source
AI summary
A system and method for detecting global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks includes collecting GPS readings along with inertial navigational system (INS) readings as a ground truth, and sequentially testing the GPS readings and INS readings through the use of a sequential probability ratio testing (SPRT) process.


