GPU Protected Execution Environment for Secure Workloads

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current security solutions for graphics processing units (GPUs) are inadequate in protecting workloads from malware, both on the GPU and central processing unit (CPU), and fail to provide strict access control and proof of secure execution for security-sensitive tasks.

Innovation Solution

A protected execution environment is established on GPUs using Secure Enclaves, where protected graphics modules are created and executed, ensuring secure execution and access control through hardware-based attestation and memory encryption, allowing remote patching and verification.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If operating system-based security is used for graphics processing, then ease of operation is improved, but reliability deteriorates due to malware attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of operationVSAvoidreliability
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the graphics processing system into trusted and untrusted execution environments. A trusted execution environment (TEE) is established within the GPU to isolate security-sensitive workloads from the untrusted host system and untrusted GPU code. This segmentation allows the system to maintain ease of operation through the operating system while ensuring reliability through hardware-enforced isolation boundaries that prevent malware from compromising protected workloads.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces a trusted execution environment as an intermediary layer between the untrusted host system and the security-sensitive graphics workloads. This TEE acts as a mediator that verifies the integrity of code and data before execution, providing cryptographic proof of trustworthiness. The intermediary protects against malware attacks while maintaining compatibility with the existing operating system architecture.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If access control for graphics assets is implemented, then reliability is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovereliabilityVSAvoiddevice complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The trusted execution environment implements self-service access control mechanisms where the TEE automatically manages its own security credentials and enforces access policies without requiring complex external security infrastructure. The TEE autonomously verifies the identity and authorization of entities seeking to access protected graphics assets, reducing the need for additional security hardware or complex software-based access control systems.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If proof of secure execution is provided, then reliability is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovereliabilityVSAvoiddevice complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The trusted execution environment provides cryptographic feedback mechanisms that generate and transmit proof of secure execution to external parties. The TEE continuously monitors the integrity of code and data during execution and provides cryptographic attestations that verify the workload is running in a trusted environment. This feedback system enables remote verification of security without requiring complex inspection infrastructure on the client side.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS9519803B2Secure environment for graphics processing units
Publication Date: 2016.12.13 INTEL CORP
  • US9519803B2 patent drawing
  • US9519803B2 patent drawing
  • US9519803B2 patent drawing

AI summary

In accordance with some embodiments, a protected execution environment may be defined for a graphics processing unit. This framework not only protects the workloads from malware running on the graphics processing unit but also protects those workloads from malware running on the central processing unit. In addition, the trust framework may facilitate proof of secure execution by measuring the code and data structures used to execute the workload. If a part of the trusted computing base of this framework or protected execution environment is compromised, that part can be patched remotely and the patching can be proven remotely throughout attestation in some embodiments.