Hardware Cryptographic Handles for Context-Bound Key Usage
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing hardware processors face challenges in protecting encryption keys from unauthorized access and misuse, particularly in scenarios where stolen encrypted data can be used outside the intended environment, leading to security vulnerabilities.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a handle-based system where encryption keys are converted into handles that include authentication tags and additional authentication data, restricting their usage to specific modes or environments, ensuring that stolen handles are useless outside the intended context.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If encryption keys are stored in hardware processors, then cryptographic operations can be performed efficiently, but the keys become vulnerable to theft and unauthorized use outside the intended environment
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces handles as intermediary representations of encryption keys. Instead of directly exposing or storing keys in accessible form, the system converts keys into handles that can be used for cryptographic operations but cannot be easily extracted or misused. The handle acts as a mediator between the key and the cryptographic operations, maintaining security while enabling functionality.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent transforms the encryption key into a different form (handle) with modified parameters. The handle contains authentication tags and additional authentication data that restrict its usage context. This parameter change ensures that even if the handle is stolen, it cannot be used outside the intended environment, thus resolving the security vulnerability while maintaining operational efficiency.
2Ease of operation
If encryption keys are made accessible for cryptographic operations, then operations can be performed, but stolen keys can be misused outside the intended context
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary anti-action by embedding authentication tags and additional authentication data into the handle structure before the key is used. These embedded elements pre-establish restrictions that prevent unauthorized usage. When the handle is stolen or extracted, the authentication mechanisms already in place automatically prevent misuse outside the intended context, countering the potential harm before it can occur.
Solution Approach 2:
The handle serves as an intermediary that controls key accessibility. It allows cryptographic operations to proceed when proper authentication is provided, but blocks unauthorized usage attempts. The handle mediates between the need for key accessibility and the need to prevent harmful unauthorized usage.
3Adaptability or versatility
If traditional key management is used, then keys can be freely used, but revocation and control of key usage are difficult
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces dynamic control mechanisms for key usage through handles. The authentication tags and additional authentication data in handles can be configured to enforce specific usage policies, time limits, or environmental constraints. This dynamic approach allows flexible key usage control and easy revocation by simply invalidating or regenerating handles, without requiring complex key management infrastructure.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems, methods, and apparatuses relating to circuitry to implement an instruction to create and/or use data that is restricted in how it can be used are described. In one embodiment, a hardware processor comprises a decoder of a core to decode a single instruction into a decoded single instruction, the single instruction comprising a first input operand of a handle including a ciphertext of an encryption key (e.g., cryptographic key), an authentication tag, and additional authentication data, and a second input operand of data encrypted with the encryption key, and an execution unit of the core to execute the decoded single instruction to: perform a first check of the authentication tag against the ciphertext and the additional authentication data for any modification to the ciphertext or the additional authentication data, perform a second check of a current request of the core against one or more restrictions specified by the additional authentication data of the handle, decrypt the ciphertext to generate the encryption key only when the first check indicates no modification to the ciphertext or the additional authentication data, and the second check indicates the one or more restrictions are not violated, decrypt the data encrypted with the encryption key to generate unencrypted data, and provide the unencrypted data as a resultant of the single instruction.