Hash-Based Root of Trust Binding for DC-SCM and HPM Mobility

The patent performs preliminary binding verification during system initialization by calculating hash values from hardware identity certificates and firmware measurements, and storing these binding relationships before the DC-SCM is moved or reused. This preliminary action ensures that when the DC-SCM is later moved between systems, the pre-established binding verification can quickly determine whether the movement is authorized, thus maintaining security while enabling flexibility.

The patent implements a feedback mechanism where the BMC continuously verifies the binding relationship between DC-SCM and HPM by comparing current hash values with stored binding information. This feedback loop provides real-time security verification, allowing the system to detect unauthorized movements and trigger appropriate responses, thereby maintaining reliability while permitting legitimate adaptability.

The patent segments the security verification process by device type, applying different verification strategies to different SPDM-capable hardware devices. Instead of uniformly verifying all devices with the same complex process, the system identifies and verifies critical devices (such as processors, memory controllers, and I/O devices) with full hash value verification, while using simplified verification for less critical devices. This segmentation maintains high security for critical components while reducing overall system complexity.

The patent implements partial verification by focusing hash value verification on the most critical hardware components that form the root of trust chain. Rather than verifying every single hardware device in the system with equal depth, the system performs exhaustive verification on critical path devices while using lighter verification methods for non-critical devices, achieving adequate security with reduced processing overhead.

The patent implements dynamic recovery actions that adapt based on the specific verification failure scenario and system configuration. Rather than uniformly preventing boot for all verification failures, the system evaluates the nature of the failure and applies appropriate responses: for minor failures, it may allow boot with warnings; for critical failures, it prevents boot and triggers recovery procedures. This dynamic approach balances security with operational flexibility, allowing legitimate operations to proceed while blocking unauthorized access.

The patent changes security parameters dynamically based on verification results and configured policies. When binding verification fails, the system adjusts security parameters such as boot authorization, license validation, and configuration access based on user-configured security policies. This allows the same verification failure to result in different outcomes depending on the configured risk tolerance and operational requirements, balancing security enforcement with operational continuity.