Hierarchical Encryption for Dynamic Packet Field Access Control

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Communication networks face security and privacy issues due to intermediate nodes having unrestricted access to data packets, which can lead to misbehavior and unauthorized access to sensitive information, especially in seamless mobility scenarios where nodes act as routers or bridges.

Innovation Solution

A protocol for hierarchical encryption of communication packets that allows end-points to dynamically control access rights based on the behavior of intermediate routers, using a system where each field of the packet can be encrypted separately and access limited on a need-to-know basis, with well-behaved routers receiving more decryption keys.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If intermediate nodes are given unrestricted access to data packets for routing purposes, then routing functionality is enabled, but security and privacy are compromised

Engineering Contradiction:
Improverouting functionalityVSAvoidsecurity and privacy risks
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The packet is divided into multiple fields (header fields and payload fields), and encryption keys are segmented and distributed selectively to intermediate nodes based on their specific routing needs. Each node receives only the keys necessary for its particular function, not all keys for the entire packet.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Different intermediate nodes are assigned different sets of decryption keys according to their local requirements and trust levels. Nodes closer to the source or with specific routing functions receive different key subsets than nodes further downstream or with more general routing capabilities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

2Object-affected harmful factors

If all packet fields are encrypted to maximize security, then security is improved, but intermediate nodes cannot perform routing functions

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity protectionVSAvoidrouting capability
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

Decryption keys are pre-distributed to intermediate nodes before packet transmission based on their anticipated routing roles. This preliminary key distribution enables nodes to decrypt only the specific fields they need to process for routing decisions, while other fields remain encrypted.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system dynamically adjusts which packet fields are encrypted and which are accessible to each intermediate node based on real-time routing requirements and trust assessments. Encryption is not static but adapts to the specific routing path and node capabilities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

3Adaptability or versatility

If intermediate nodes are given access to more packet fields, then routing flexibility is improved, but access control and security management become more complex

Engineering Contradiction:
Improverouting flexibilityVSAvoidaccess control complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The key management system is segmented into hierarchical levels where a master key can derive multiple subordinate keys. This segmentation simplifies access control by allowing centralized key generation and distribution while maintaining fine-grained control over which nodes access which fields.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The encryption/decryption mechanism serves multiple functions simultaneously: it provides security protection, enables selective field access for routing, and implements access control all through the same cryptographic framework. This multi-functionality reduces overall system complexity despite the need for fine-grained control.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

4Object-affected harmful factors

If selective field encryption is implemented to limit access, then security is improved, but device complexity and processing overhead increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaccess restrictionVSAvoidencryption system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The routing protocol and encryption/decryption operations are merged into a unified process. Intermediate nodes perform routing decisions and field decryption in an integrated manner rather than as separate steps, reducing processing overhead and system complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

Solution Approach 2:

The cryptographic system is designed to be universal, handling both security encryption and routing information access control through the same mechanism. This eliminates the need for separate access control systems and reduces overall device complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Data Source

PatentUS8245028B2Method and apparatus for dynamic, seamless security in communication protocols
Publication Date: 2012.08.14 ARRIS ENTERPRISES LLC
  • US8245028B2 patent drawing
  • US8245028B2 patent drawing
  • US8245028B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Communication nodes, acting as intermediate routers for communication packets transmitted between a source node and a destination node, are provided with different access rights to the fields of the routed communication packets. Routes of intermediate routers between the source node and the destination node are discovered and the identities of intermediate routers on the discovered routes are collected. The aggregate trust levels of the intermediate routers are computed allowing the most trusted route to be selected. Encryption keys are securely distributed to intermediate routers on the most trusted route based on the trust level of the intermediate routers and fields of the communication packets are encrypted with encryption keys corresponding to the assigned trust level. Intermediated nodes are thereby prevented from accessing selected fields of the communication packets.