HLR VLR Registration Handling for DoS Attack Mitigation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Wireless communication networks, particularly GSM networks, are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks due to the lack of authentication mechanisms in SS7 protocols, which can disrupt subscriber services by allowing rogue entities to fake registration requests and overload network resources.

Innovation Solution

An enhanced Home Location Register (HLR) system that identifies and prevents disruption by flagging rogue Visitor Location Registers (VLRs), maintaining the subscriber's previous registered location until successful registration with a trusted VLR, and delaying call routing until registration is confirmed, thereby blocking invalid location changes and preventing service disruption.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If the HLR processes registration requests from all VLRs without authentication, then the network maintains high availability and ease of operation, but the system becomes vulnerable to DoS attacks where rogue entities can fake registration requests and overload network resources

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveservice integrityVSAvoidregistration control mechanism
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The HLR performs preliminary actions by maintaining the subscriber's previous registered location and delaying the cancellation of the current serving VLR registration until the new VLR registration is confirmed successful. This preliminary preservation of the old registration prevents service disruption in case the new registration fails due to a rogue VLR, thus resolving the contradiction between maintaining service integrity and avoiding unnecessary registration complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system prepares compensatory measures in advance by keeping the previous registered location active as a backup. If the new VLR registration fails (indicating a potential DoS attack), the system automatically falls back to the previously registered location, cushioning against the harmful effects of rogue entities without requiring complex real-time authentication mechanisms

Inventive Principle:
Principle #11Beforehand cushioning (Prior cushioning)

2Speed

If the HLR immediately cancels the current serving VLR registration upon receiving a new registration request, then the location update process is fast and efficient, but the system becomes vulnerable to service disruption when rogue VLRs send fake registration requests

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvelocation update speedVSAvoidservice continuity
Core Design Contradiction:
SpeedVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of immediately canceling the current serving VLR registration, the HLR performs a preliminary check by attempting to register the subscriber at the new VLR first. Only after confirming successful registration does the HLR proceed to cancel the old registration. This preliminary verification maintains fast location updates while preventing service disruption from rogue VLRs

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system uses feedback from the new VLR registration attempt to determine whether to cancel the old registration. If the new VLR confirms successful registration, the old registration is canceled; if not, the old registration is maintained. This feedback mechanism ensures both speed and reliability in location updates

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

3Productivity

If the HLR processes all registration requests without verification, then the network operates with high productivity and minimal overhead, but rogue entities can inundate the network with needless traffic to overload network resources

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveregistration processing throughputVSAvoidnetwork overload from rogue entities
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The harmful element (rogue VLR registration requests) is extracted and isolated by implementing a verification mechanism that separates legitimate requests from fraudulent ones. The HLR verifies whether the new VLR successfully registered the subscriber before processing the location update, effectively filtering out DoS attack traffic while maintaining high productivity for legitimate registrations

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Data Source

PatentUS20220124478A1Visitor location register registration handling
Publication Date: 2022.04.21 HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE DEV LP
  • US20220124478A1 patent drawing
  • US20220124478A1 patent drawing
  • US20220124478A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Example implementations relate to registering a Visitor Location Register (VLR) at a Home Location Register (HLR). A request from a VLR may be received. The received request may be a request to update a location record of a subscriber associated with a subscriber profile at a database. A record of the database may be checked to determine whether the requesting VLR is a flagged VLR. Responsive to determining that the VLR is flagged, a cancelation of a currently registered VLR may be delayed. The delay may include maintaining the registration of the currently registered VLR while attempting to register the subscriber at the requesting VLR. Where the requesting VLR is successfully registered, the currently registered VLR may be canceled.