Homogeneous Cryptography Voting System with Blockchain
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing electronic voting systems face challenges in balancing coercion-resistance and individual verifiability, often prioritizing coercion legitimacy at the expense of integrity, leading to vulnerabilities in voter privacy and voting result transparency.
Innovation Solution
An electronic voting system utilizing homogeneous cryptography and blockchain technology to ensure coercion-resistance and individual verifiability through zero-knowledge proofs and verifiable decryption, preventing tampering by allowing voters to confirm their votes without revealing their identity and ensuring the integrity of voting results.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the system prioritizes coercion-resistance by transforming votes so that even voters cannot know their own vote, then voter privacy is protected, but individual verifiability is broken and voters cannot confirm their voting exists
Solution Approach 1:
The system separates the vote transformation process into two independent cryptographic components: FHE-encrypted voting messages that preserve voter privacy and SNARK proofs that enable verifiability. This segmentation allows each component to fulfill its specific function without compromising the other, resolving the contradiction between coercion-resistance and individual verifiability
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces SNARK (Zero-Knowledge Proof) as an intermediary mechanism that enables voters to verify their votes are properly counted without revealing vote content or allowing vote reproduction. This intermediary satisfies both coercion-resistance (by not revealing votes) and individual verifiability (by enabling confirmation of vote inclusion)
2Ease of operation
If the system delegates voting privacy and result integrity to an administrator with specific authority, then system operation is simplified, but the system becomes vulnerable to corruption and tampering
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements self-service through cryptographic proofs where voters independently verify their own votes are properly counted using SNARK proofs, and the system automatically detects duplicate votes through blockchain serialization. This eliminates reliance on administrator authority while maintaining operational simplicity, resolving the contradiction between ease of operation and integrity
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces feedback mechanisms where voters receive cryptographic proofs confirming their vote inclusion, and the system provides automatic rejection of duplicate votes. This feedback loop ensures integrity without requiring trusted administrators, while maintaining user-friendly operation through automated verification
3Loss of information
If the system allows voters to confirm their voting for individual verifiability, then verifiability is achieved, but coercion legitimacy is compromised as voters can identify their own votes
Solution Approach 1:
The system applies different cryptographic properties to different aspects of the vote: FHE encryption provides global privacy protection for vote content, while SNARK proofs provide localized verifiability for vote inclusion. This local quality differentiation allows voters to verify their votes are counted without being able to identify or reproduce the actual vote content, resolving the contradiction between individual verifiability and coercion-resistance
Data Source
AI summary
Disclosed are an electronic voting system based on homogeneous cryptography and a method thereof. An electronic voting method includes the steps of: (a) generating a serial number sn by using election identification information eid and a his/her secret key, wherein the election identification information eid is shared through a block chain; (b) encrypting a voting message M through verifiable homogeneous cryptography to generate a ciphertext CT, and generating a zero-knowledge proof key π for the voting message; and (c) transmitting an electronic ballot including the serial number sn, the ciphertext CT, and the zero-knowledge proof key π to a block chain network as a transaction.