Homomorphic Vote Analysis Using Candidate Masks Without Decryption
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Solution Overview
Problem
In voting systems, time-sequential analysis of homomorphic encrypted data requires storing plain text voting results, posing a risk of individual privacy violation, and existing homomorphic encryption methods lead to resource waste and data leakage.
Innovation Solution
A method for generating a homomorphic encrypted message including voting analysis data by performing time-sequential analysis on homomorphically encrypted voting data, using candidate masks and vote masks to generate encrypted messages representing voter choices and candidate selections, allowing calculations without decryption.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If homomorphic encryption is applied to voting data, then individual privacy is protected, but time-sequential analysis becomes difficult to perform
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces candidate masks as intermediary elements that enable time-sequential analysis on homomorphically encrypted voting data. The masks act as mediators between the encrypted voting data and the analysis operation, allowing the system to perform temporal analysis without decrypting the votes, thus resolving the contradiction between privacy protection and analysis capability
Solution Approach 2:
The patent transforms the voting data from simple encrypted values to structured homomorphic encrypted messages with multiple slots representing different time periods and candidates. This parameter transformation enables time-sequential analysis to be performed on the encrypted data structure itself, maintaining privacy while enabling the required analysis functionality
2Ease of operation
If voting data is stored in plain text for time-sequential analysis, then analysis can be performed, but individual privacy is violated
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses homomorphic encryption as an intermediary layer between the voting data and the analysis process. This allows time-sequential analysis to be performed on encrypted data without exposing the actual vote values, thereby maintaining individual privacy while enabling the analysis functionality
Solution Approach 2:
The patent segments the voting data into multiple homomorphic encrypted messages, each representing a specific time period or election cycle. This segmentation allows the system to perform time-sequential analysis by processing each segment independently while maintaining encryption, thus avoiding privacy violations
3Productivity
If encrypted data is decrypted for calculation, then calculations can be performed, but data leakage risk increases and resources are wasted
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces the traditional mechanical decryption-calculation-encryption process with a homomorphic calculation system. This substitution allows calculations to be performed directly on encrypted data without decryption, eliminating data leakage risks and resource waste associated with repeated encryption/decryption cycles while maintaining full calculation capability
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces homomorphic encryption as an intermediary that enables calculation on encrypted data. This intermediary allows the system to perform productive calculations without the harmful effects of decryption, as the encryption layer remains intact throughout the calculation process
Data Source
AI summary
An electronic apparatus which generates a homomorphic encrypted message by homomorphically encrypting voting analysis data includes: a processor configured to execute the at least one instruction, wherein the processor is configured to generate a vote-homomorphic encrypted message including the voting data of the voter for a first candidate and a second candidate by using a first candidate mask corresponding to the first candidate in a first election and a second candidate mask corresponding to the second candidate in a second election, for a first election-homomorphic encrypted message acquired by homomorphically encrypting the voting data of the voter in the first election and a second election-homomorphic encrypted message acquired by homomorphically encrypting the voting data in the second election, and generate a result-homomorphic encrypted message including the number of voters who select the first candidate and the second candidate by using the generated vote-homomorphic encrypted message.