Host Attestation via Merkle Tree Key Segmentation
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Solution Overview
Problem
In distributed computing environments, ensuring the integrity and secure configuration of virtual computing environments hosted by third-party service providers is challenging, particularly in verifying the authenticity of host configurations and managing cryptographic keys for secure digital signatures and communications.
Innovation Solution
A system that generates and verifies signed attestations using Merkle trees of one-time-use cryptographic keys, where a trusted platform module (TPM) confirms host configurations, and a signature authority manages key distribution and revocation within a cryptographic signature scheme.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If cryptographic keys are distributed from a central authority to multiple computing entities, then digital signatures and encrypted communications can be performed by various entities on behalf of the central authority, but controlling and tracking the distribution of these keys becomes complex and difficult
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the key distribution system into hierarchical levels: a central authority that generates master keys, intermediate key distribution servers that receive and redistribute keys to computing entities, and local key storage on each entity. This segmentation allows the central authority to maintain control while enabling distributed cryptographic operations without directly managing keys on every entity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces intermediate key distribution servers as mediators between the central authority and computing entities. These intermediaries receive cryptographic keys from the central authority, manage their own key pools, and distribute keys to computing entities that request them. This intermediary layer simplifies the central authority's workload while maintaining centralized control and enabling versatile cryptographic operations across the distributed system.
2Reliability
If a central authority maintains control over cryptographic keys, then digital signatures and encrypted communications can be secured, but the system becomes vulnerable if the central authority is compromised or operates within an untrusted distributed environment
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary verification mechanisms where computing entities verify the authenticity and validity of cryptographic keys before using them. The key distribution system includes pre-established trust relationships, digital certificates, and validation protocols that allow entities to confirm keys are from the legitimate central authority and have not been compromised, enabling secure operations even in partially untrusted environments.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements key revocation mechanisms that allow the central authority to invalidate compromised keys before they can cause harm. The system includes revocation lists, certificate expiration dates, and real-time validation checks that cushion against the impact of key compromise by detecting and preventing use of revoked keys, thereby protecting the overall security of digital signatures and encrypted communications.
3Reliability
If cryptographic keys are revoked after distribution, then security can be maintained by invalidating compromised keys, but providing provable indication of key revocation status requires additional verification infrastructure
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a feedback mechanism where computing entities can query the key distribution server or central authority to verify the current status of cryptographic keys. The system provides real-time or periodic feedback on key validity, revocation status, and expiration information, allowing entities to confirm whether a key is still valid before using it for digital signatures or encrypted communications. This feedback loop simplifies the revocation verification process compared to manual checking against distributed lists.
Data Source
AI summary
A service provider provides virtual computing services using a fleet of one or more host computer systems. Each of the host computer systems may be equipped with a trusted platform module (“TPM”). The service provider, the host computer systems, and the virtual computing environments generate attestations that prove the integrity of the system. The attestations are signed with a one-time-use cryptographic key that is verifiable against the public keys of the service provider, a host computer system, and a virtual computing environment. The public key of the host computer system is integrated into a hash tree that links the public key of the host computer system to the public key of the service provider. The public key of the virtual computing environment is signed using a one-time-use graphic key issued to the host computer system that hosts the virtual computing environment.