Host Security via Isolated Container Dispatcher Segmentation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional systems face security vulnerabilities as a host with a dispatcher module is susceptible to compromise by intruders, allowing unauthorized access and control over Virtual Machines (VMs) and Containers, particularly due to remote shell access and web server vulnerabilities.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a host as a secure Container or VM by allocating one Container for the dispatcher module in an isolated environment, where a truncated dispatcher runs on the host OS and a secured dispatcher module runs inside the Container, restricting intruder access and allowing direct administrator connection to the dispatcher within the Container.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the dispatcher module runs directly on the host OS, then the system structure is simple and easy to operate, but the host becomes vulnerable to security compromises allowing intruders to create or delete VMs and Containers
Solution Approach 1:
The system is segmented into two distinct dispatcher modules: a first dispatcher module running inside an isolated container environment with full functionality, and a second dispatcher module running on the host OS with truncated functionality. This segmentation isolates the critical security functions from the host, preventing security compromises while maintaining operational simplicity through the second module's limited interface.
Solution Approach 2:
The first dispatcher module inside the container acts as an intermediary between the host system and the virtualization management functions. It receives and processes authentication requests and management commands, providing a secure buffer that prevents direct access to host resources while still enabling full virtualization management capabilities.
2Ease of operation
If remote shell access is provided to the host, then administrator control is convenient, but intruders can exploit this access to compromise the entire host and all VMs/Containers
Solution Approach 1:
The remote shell access functionality is extracted from the host OS and relocated to the container environment where the first dispatcher module runs. This extraction removes the security vulnerability from the host while preserving administrator access capabilities within the isolated container, allowing convenient control without exposing the host to compromise.
3Ease of operation
If the web server interface is exposed on the host, then service access is convenient, but it creates additional attack vectors for intruders to compromise the host
Solution Approach 1:
The web server interface functionality is segmented and relocated to run within the container environment alongside the first dispatcher module. This segmentation isolates the web interface from the host, maintaining service accessibility while reducing the host's attack surface. The web server can still be accessed remotely but operates in the isolated container space rather than directly on the host.
Data Source
AI summary
A Container or VM running on physical host is allocated for hosting a dispatcher module in an isolated environment. A thin dispatcher runs on the host OS, while another secured dispatcher module runs inside the allocated Container. If an intruder gains access to the host, he would not be able to send commands to the dispatcher module running inside the Container. The intruder may access the thin dispatcher module, but would not be able to create or delete VMs or Containers. The administrator can connect directly to the dispatcher module inside the container. A remote shell access goes to the host container instead of a physical host. Thus, the security of the host is improved.