Wireless Hotspot Bundling Pricing Algorithm
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Solution Overview
Problem
Users of Wireless Community Networks (WCNs) face the inconvenience of paying multiple usage fees for accessing multiple closely located hotspots, especially when moving around a geographic area, as current revenue sharing models do not support bundled offerings of independently-owned routers, limiting user mobility and revenue potential for hotspot owners.
Innovation Solution
A system and method for offering bundled hotspots with pricing algorithms that allow users to access multiple hotspots at a lower total cost and ensure fair revenue sharing among hotspot owners, using cooperative game theory and the Shapley Value Division mechanism to determine optimal prices and revenue allocation.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If users access multiple hotspots individually, then each hotspot can be accessed with simple pricing, but users must pay multiple usage fees which increases total cost and limits user mobility
Solution Approach 1:
The patent combines multiple individually-owned hotspots into a unified bundle offering. Users pay a single aggregated fee for access to the bundle of hotspots rather than paying separate fees for each hotspot, thereby reducing total cost and enabling seamless mobility across multiple locations.
2Quantity of substance
If hotspots are offered as bundled offerings, then users can access multiple hotspots at reduced cost, but revenue allocation among hotspot owners becomes complex
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a WCN organizing company as an intermediary that manages the bundle pricing and revenue distribution. This intermediary applies the Shapley Value Division mechanism to fairly allocate revenues among hotspot owners based on their marginal contributions to the bundle, simplifying the complexity for individual owners while ensuring equitable distribution.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent transforms the revenue allocation problem by changing the parameter from simple equal division to Shapley Value Division based on marginal contributions. This parameter change enables fairer and more accurate revenue distribution among hotspot owners participating in the bundle.
3Device complexity
If traditional revenue sharing is used, then implementation is simple, but hotspot owners do not receive equitable allocation and bundling is not supported
Solution Approach 1:
The patent changes the revenue sharing parameter from traditional equal division to Shapley Value Division, which calculates each hotspot owner's fair share based on their marginal contributions to different bundle configurations. This ensures equitable allocation while supporting bundled offerings.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements a feedback mechanism where the Shapley Value Division continuously evaluates the marginal contributions of each hotspot owner across various bundle scenarios, ensuring that revenue allocation reflects the actual value each owner provides to the bundled offering.
Data Source
AI summary
A method (and structure) for providing services for wireless hotspots. The services are offered to selectively include bundled hotspots as well as single hotspots.